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CHILDREN, KIN, AND COURT:
DESIGNING THIRD PARTY CUSTODY
POLICY TO PROTECT CHILDREN, THIRD
PARTIES, AND PARENTS
Josh Gupta-Kagan*
ABSTRACT
Millions of American children are raised primarily by people other
than their parents, mostly by grandparents and other kin, and millions more
are raised by third parties for some period of their childhood. In most such
situations, informal arrangements negotiated by family members and kinship networks effectively provide care for these children. Many cases, however, require some formal legal arrangement; third party custody orders
are needed to obtain necessary services and benefits for children whose
parents are absent, and to protect children in the rare but still significant
instances in which a parent is abusive or neglectful.
States currently have widely varying means of adjudicating child custody disputes between parents and third parties. One Supreme Court case,
Troxel v. Granville, addresses contests between parents and third parties.
While Troxel ruled for the parent in that particular case, it neither represents a strong parents’ rights opinion nor does it provide states with clear
guidance on how to shape third party custody statutes. This Article argues
that states should enact child custody statutes according to three primary
points. First, due to the wide range of situations in which a third party
custody order may be necessary, states should permit a broad set of individuals to seek custody. Concerns that broad standing provisions would lead
to a flood of meritless lawsuits are not borne out by actual data in states
that have had nearly unlimited standing. Second, recognizing the constitutional primacy of the parent-child relationship, states should hold third parties to a high substantive standard, and require them to prove that parental
custody would harm the child in some way. Any lesser standard—such as
the best interests of the child standard applied in some states—insufficiently
protects relationships between parents and children. Third, recognizing
that the core parental right of the “care, custody and control” of a child is
at stake, states should generally hold third parties to a clear and convincing
burden of proof. Most states apply a preponderance burden or have not
specified a burden. One exception should apply: When a third party has
acted as a parent for a significant time and a child’s birth parent has not

* J.D. 2004, New York University School of Law. Senior Attorney, The Children’s Law Center, Washington, D.C. The author would like to thank Avni GuptaKagan, Martin Guggenheim, Erik Pitchal, Carla Rappaport, Judith Sandalow, Vivek
Sankaran, and Diane Weinroth. The ideas in this Article are the authors’ own and do
not necessarily reflect the views of The Children’s Law Center.
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done so, then that parent’s constitutional rights are diminished, society’s
interest in maintaining the long-term bond between the child and third party
is enhanced, and a lower burden of proof should apply.
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INTRODUCTION
Millions of American children live with adults other than their
parents, and millions of these children are raised primarily by these
adults.1 Millions more children will, at some point, require the temporary care of a third party.2 For the most part, children in both categories depend on extended family and kinship networks to care for them
when their parents cannot or will not. These third party caregivers are
essential elements of American families, especially lower income and
minority families.3
The public has recognized the tremendous scope of third party
caregiving, catalyzing the coinage of new terms, like “grandfamilies.”4 Such great numbers of third parties are rearing children that
Congress has passed modest legislation to assist them. In late 2008,
President Bush signed a bill into law creating “kinship navigator” programs to assist kinship caregivers in obtaining services for children in

1. See infra Part I.A.
2. See infra Part I.A.
3. See infra note 25 and accompanying text.
4. See, e.g., AARP, Guide to Public Benefits for Grandfamilies, http://www.aarp.
org/families/grandparents/raising_grandchild/public_benefits_guide.html (last visited
Sept. 9, 2007). The mainstream media has repeatedly noted the scope of third party
caregiving. See, e.g., Grandparents Raising Grandchildren: Skipping a Generation,
ECONOMIST, June 16, 2007, at 53; Ian Urbina, With Parents Absent, Trying to Keep
Child Care in the Family, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2006, § 1, at 16; Timothy Williams, A
Place for Grandparents Who Are Parents Again, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 2005, at B1.
Even the federal government operates a website providing advice for grandparents
raising grandchildren. OFFICE OF CITIZEN SERVS. & COMMC’NS, U.S. GEN. SERVS.
ADMIN., GRANDPARENTS RAISING GRANDCHILDREN, http://www.usa.gov/Topics/
Grandparents.shtml (last visited Oct. 7, 2008).
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their care.5 Academics have also recognized that the complex web of
attachments that millions of children have do not always lend themselves to neat categories of relationships—those that receive legal recognition and those that do not.6 Children’s relationships with their
parents represent the most important relationships that children have.
Recognizing that importance does not diminish the importance of protecting relationships between children and other kin and third parties,
and recent scholarship has addressed how the law can recognize the
preeminent status of the parent-child relationship while also protecting
other important relationships.7
Legal frameworks for third party caregiving have not kept pace
with the public’s awareness of it, and the lack of legal frameworks can
leave families in precarious positions. For most families, perhaps
even a large majority of families, informal third party custody arrangements will suffice. But in a significant number of situations, the absence of formal legal custody leaves third party caregivers and the
children they care for in legal limbo. Without legal custody orders,
third parties have difficulty obtaining health care for children, enrolling them in school, and obtaining other benefits or services for the
children in their care. In the most emotionally fraught situations, third
parties and children can find themselves without any legal authority
when disagreements arise between the third parties and parents, when
the parents reappear after long absences, or when involved parents
behave in a manner that the third party believes harmful to the child.
To prevent these harms, I propose that states should permit certain third parties to seek and obtain custody of children. I do not argue
that third party caregivers should seek formal court custody orders in
all, or even most, cases; third party custody statutes would have no
effect on families that have informal third party custody arrangements
that work. Nor do I argue that when third parties face legal difficulties
that a court custody order is the only or best legal solution. A spectrum of options from the recently enacted “kinship navigator” programs or more formal legal documents like custodial powers of
attorney,8 could help many, and perhaps most, third party caregivers
5. Fostering Connections to Success and Increasing Adoptions Act of 2008, Pub.
L. No. 110-351, § 102(a), 122 Stat. 3953 (2008).
6. See, e.g., Clare Huntington, Rights Myopia in Child Welfare, 53 UCLA L. REV.
637 (2006); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse & Sacha Coupet, Troxel v. Granville: Implications for At Risk Children and the Amicus Curiae Role of University-Based Interdisciplinary Centers for Children, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 857 (2001).
7. See, e.g., Huntington, supra note 6; Woodhouse & Coupet, supra note 6.
8. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-2301 (Supp. 2008) (establishing a custodial
power of attorney).
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obtain the services for children and provide attractive alternatives to
custody litigation. Such policy options represent an important part of
a comprehensive approach to third party custody issues, but such policy options are beyond the scope of this Article. I do, however, posit
that no such policies can erase the need for formal legal custody in
three sets of cases: when legal custody is necessary to protect deep
bonds between a child and a third party who is their primary caretaker;
when legal custody is necessary to obtain essential services; and when
a child is at risk of severe abuse or neglect absent the legal security of
a custody order.
This Article will proceed as follows. It will first explore the extent of third party caregiving and use that data to explore which third
parties need access to court to obtain child custody. It will next summarize and analyze Troxel v. Granville, the 2000 Supreme Court case
that governs third party custody and visitation. Then, applying the
lessons from those two sections, it will analyze in detail three central
questions that any statute providing a means for third parties to seek
custody must address:
First, who, other than a parent, ought to be able to file for custody
of a child? I argue that states should permit a relatively broad set of
people to file for custody due to the variety of situations that require
someone other than parents to have custody of a child. Strict standing
limitations pose an unacceptable risk of excluding meritorious claims
from court and this risk, I will argue, is more harmful than the risk that
broad standing provisions will permit too many people to file harassing or meritless suits against parents.
Second, what must those third parties prove substantively to win
custody of a child? This Article will argue that third parties should
only obtain custody if they prove that the parents are unable or unwilling to care for the child, or that custody with the parents would be
detrimental to the child. This standard is preferable to the infamously
vague best interests of the child standard and balances the primacy of
the parent-child relationship with children’s interests to maintain relationships with significant adults in their life.
Third, what burden of proof must third parties satisfy with their
substantive evidence? This Article will argue that states should require third parties to meet a clear and convincing burden in most
cases. Since the legal norm remains that parents should have custody
of their children, a burden of proof that equally skews error between
parents and third parties is inappropriate. However, when a third party
has acted as a parent—raising children while the biological parents are
absent—then the law should recognize the relationship that forms be-
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tween the third parties and children and apply a preponderance of the
evidence standard.
THE SCOPE

OF

FOR

I.
THIRD PARTY CAREGIVING AND THE NEED
BROAD THIRD PARTY STANDING

A. Who Needs to Be Able to Seek Custody
Nearly 14 million children live with third parties9—adults other
than their parents—and the number of children primarily cared for by
third parties has been growing.10 Before determining which of the
millions of third parties who are significantly involved in children’s
lives should obtain custody, one must first determine which situations
commonly require custody orders and thus when third parties ought to
have standing to seek custody. This section seeks to identify a set of
repeating fact patterns from which policy makers can derive principles
for determining who should have access to court to seek custody of a
child. If states prevent individuals in these common situations from
having standing to seek custody, then a significant number of legitimate cases will be excluded from court to the detriment of children.
States should grant these third parties standing to seek custody, and
put their evidence before a court to determine if they meet a strict
substantive standard.
A third party custody order can satisfy three central needs of children and third parties, and I will explore the need for third party standing in light of these needs. First, a custody order enables a third party
to obtain necessary services for a child.11 This benefit is more practical than psychological. A custody order is often the best (and some9. The Census Bureau estimated that 13,851,000 children lived with third parties
in 2001, excluding foster children. ROSE M. KREIDER & JASON FIELDS, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, LIVING ARRANGEMENTS OF CHILDREN: 2001 11
tbl.8 (2005), available at http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/child/p70-104.
pdf [hereinafter LIVING ARRANGEMENTS OF CHILDREN: 2001].
10. Estimates of the rate of growth of kinship care range as high as forty percent
over a ten year period. CASEY FAMILY PROGRAMS, THE KINSHIP REPORT: ASSESSING
THE NEEDS OF RELATIVE CAREGIVERS AND THE CHILDREN IN THEIR CARE 18 (2003),
available at http://www.casey.org/Resources/Archive/Publications/KinshipReport.
htm [hereinafter KINSHIP REPORT].
11. This purpose demonstrates a need for broader third party custody standing than
third party visitation standing. Third parties who obtain visitation rights will not have
full custody and they therefore have no need for authority to seek services or benefits
for the children and will lack the ability to protect the children from abusive or neglectful primary custodians. Third party visitation protects significant existing relationships between children and third parties. To serve this goal, states need only permit
third parties with existing significant relationships to seek legal visitation rights. The
broader goals served by third party custody orders require policymakers to consider
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times only) way of addressing issues such as consenting to health care,
obtaining health insurance, obtaining approval for a larger apartment,12 making educational decisions for a child with special needs,13
enrolling children in school, or obtaining public benefits.14 Obtaining
services is particularly important for children raised by third parties.
These children, in the aggregate, require more intensive physical and
mental health services than other children,15 and are more likely to
have some identified disability.16 Children raised by third parties are
also more likely to live below the poverty line, more likely to receive
some form of public assistance,17 and less likely to have health
insurance.18
the need to provide a broader set of individuals in a variety of situations standing to
seek custody.
12. Housing laws often require some sort of custody order to add a child to a public
housing lease. See, e.g., D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 14, § 6117.2 (2007).
13. The Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act (IDEA) permits a “parent”
and only a parent to seek remedies for a student’s right to a “free appropriate public
education.” See The Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1415
(2006). Although a third party “acting in the place of a biological or adoptive parent
. . . with whom the child lives” can qualify as a “parent” for IDEA purposes, many of
the situations described in this section can lead to confusion, especially if multiple
parties assert that they are the IDEA “parent.” Under IDEA regulations, a biological
parent is presumed to be the IDEA parent, even if a third party is the child’s primary
caretaker. 34 C.F.R. § 300.30(b)(1) (2007). Only a court order can change this presumption, § 300.30(b)(2), underlining the importance of those who may be a child’s
primary caretaker and best able to advocate for a child’s educational needs to have
access to court.
14. The Social Security Administration requires a third party seeking to become the
representative payee for a child to prove why they are the right person to receive the
child’s Social Security benefits. See Soc. Sec. Admin. Form SSA-11, Request to Be
Selected as Payee, item 3, available at http://www.ssa.gov/online/ssa-11.pdf. The Social Security Administration specifically asks if the child has a court-appointed legal
guardian, id. item 5, suggesting that third parties with a legal custody order will have
a much easier time obtaining important benefits for children in their care.
15. KINSHIP REPORT, supra note 10, at 16.
16. Nationally, 5.5% of all children living in a parent’s home have a disability.
TERRY LUGAILA & JULIA OVERTURF, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, CHILDREN AND THE HOUSEHOLDS THEY LIVE IN: 2000 8 tbl.3 (2004), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2004pubs/censr-14.pdf. That figure rises to 7.6%
for children living in a grandparent’s home, 7.1% for children living in another relative’s home, and 7.6% of children living in a non-relative’s home (excluding foster
care)—increases of about 38%. Id.
17. Id.at 14 tbl.7, 15.
18. See JASON FIELDS, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, CHILDREN’S LIVING ARRANGEMENTS AND CHARACTERISTICS: MARCH 2002 19 tbl.9
(2003), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/p20-547.pdf [hereinafter
CHILDREN’S LIVING ARRANGEMENTS AND CHARACTERISTICS: 2002] (showing percentages of children with health insurance for different types of children’s living
situations).

R

\\server05\productn\N\NYL\12-1\NYL102.txt

50

unknown

Seq: 8

LEGISLATION AND PUBLIC POLICY

8-MAY-09

10:49

[Vol. 12:43

Second, a custody order grants legal recognition, stability, permanence, and protection for children cared for by third parties. That legal recognition protects the relationship between a primary caregiver
and a child. Given the millions of long-term third party primary
caregivers,19 this is a crucial goal, and one recognized by some leading child and family advocates, such as the Casey Foundation.20 In
many murky situations—for instance, where a third party is a child’s
long-term primary caretaker and at least one parent seeks to regain
custody (or obtain it for the first time)—a custody order protects the
child’s most important relationship: that with their primary caregiver.
Harming that relationship could harm the child as well.21
Third, a custody order can protect children from neglectful or
abusive parents and from state foster care systems that can separate a
child from abusive or neglectful parents and from other family members. Policy makers should not rely on the neglect system to serve this
purpose because the neglect system is a deeply imperfect way of protecting children from abuse and neglect. In most states, only the government can open a neglect case,22 and the government’s means of
determining when abuse and neglect occurs reveals much room for
improvement both in failing to identify actual abuse and neglect that is
occurring and in initiating cases when such abuse or neglect has not
occurred.23 Third parties in the situations described below have significantly important roles in a child’s life and should have the ability
19. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
20. See KINSHIP REPORT, supra note 10, at 16 (“When relatives can’t afford to
obtain legal custody, the family stability they are trying to maintain can be disrupted
at any time by the decisions of a birth parent.”).
21. See JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, ALBERT J. SOLNIT, SONJA GOLDSTEIN & ANNA FREUD,
THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD: THE LEAST DETRIMENTAL ALTERNATIVE 37
(Free Press 1996) (describing the “pre-eminent[ ]” role of the primary caretaker as
“demonstrably more beneficial” than the role of others involved in the child’s life).
22. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 16-2305 (2001) (describing government-initiated process for filing a neglect petition). Some states do permit individuals to file private
neglect cases, which can lead to third party custody. See, e.g., Richardson v. Richardson, 766 So. 2d 1036, 1043 (Fla. 2000) (stating that “any concerned party may seek
the initiation of [dependency] proceedings”). Opening neglect cases alongside custody cases could provide some benefits including counsel for the parties and coordination of ameliorative services for parents. See infra notes 92–95 and accompanying
text. Whether that is a good course of action is beyond the scope of this Article.
23. For example, a federal court monitor in the District of Columbia has repeatedly
questioned the District’s child welfare agency’s performance in investigating abuse
and neglect allegations in a timely and thorough manner, CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF
SOC. POLICY, PROGRESS REPORT ON LaShawn A. v. Williams 4–8 (2006), available at
http://www.cssp.org/uploadFiles/DC_LaShawn_A_v_Williams_Progress_Report_to_
the_Court_02_13_06web.pdf, and the quality of that agency’s investigations. CTR.
FOR THE STUDY OF SOC. POLICY, AN ASSESSMENT OF THE QUALITY OF CHILD ABUSE
AND NEGLECT INVESTIGATIVE PRACTICES IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 2–3 (2007).

R
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to seek custody of a child whether or not a state’s imperfect neglect
system sees fit to open a neglect case. If third parties in these situations were forced to depend on the state to protect children in their
care, then those children would face too great a risk of abuse or
neglect.
Several important caveats are worth noting before I explore such
situations. First, I do not argue that a third party in all of the below
situations should always win custody. When a parent voluntarily
chooses to engage third parties in shared caregiving arrangements
without evidence that parental custody is harming the child—as often
occurs because the parent values extended kinship networks or seeks
help from third party caregivers for financial reasons24—even very
involved third parties will not have strong claims. Rather, I argue that
in these situations the bonds between a third party and a child are so
great, or the risk of harm to the child without a third party able to seek
custody so high that courts should consider a third party’s claim. Second, I do not argue that a third party in the below situations should
always seek sole legal and physical custody. In many cases, joint legal or physical custody with a parent will be the most appropriate
outcome, and will be sufficient to give the third party the ability to
make decisions jointly with the parent, protect the child, and obtain
services for him. Third, I do not argue that a custody suit of any sort
is necessary in every situation in the below categories. Many, perhaps
even most, families could handle these situations outside of court, informally or through temporary power of attorney or similar agreements. However, no category of situations can always be handled out
of court, necessitating laws that permit third party standing.
This section will identify four categories of third parties who
states should permit to seek custody: third parties who have been longterm sole primary caretakers, third parties who have shared significant
caretaking responsibilities, third parties who have suddenly become
primary caretakers, and third parties who seek custody to help children
avoid the neglect system. For each category, I will begin with statistics demonstrating the number of children who fall into each category,25 and discuss common situations within each category which
may trigger the need for third party custody.
24. See Eliza Patten, The Subordination of Subsidized Guardianship in Child Welfare Proceedings, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 237, 250 (2004) (describing a
parent’s choice to involve third party caregivers as culturally linked and as “a hedge
against poverty”).
25. The statistics cited will be national, but the numbers of children living with and/
or being primarily cared for by third parties are not evenly spread across society.
Higher proportions of minority and poor children live with third parties, a disparity
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1. Long-Term Sole Primary Caregivers
The Census Bureau estimated that in 2002 a total of 2.65 million
children lived without either parent; about four percent of all children.26 Of these children, about 1.2 million children lived with a
grandparent; 800,000 lived with another relative; and 575,000 lived
with an unrelated third party.27 Census data suggest that the majority
of these children have lived with and been primarily cared for by a
third party for a significant period of time; more than three quarters of
grandparents with primary caretaking responsibilities had had those
responsibilities for more than one year and more than a third of such
grandparents had such responsibilities for more than five years.28
These figures do not include children living in foster care29—these are
children who live with third parties without the state’s involvement.
To illustrate these statistics, assume a severely mentally ill or
drug-addicted mother gives birth and the father is unknown or not
involved. The child’s maternal aunt takes the child home with her,
with the mother’s consent or acquiescence. The mother is generally
not involved in the child’s life, and the aunt raises the child. As years
go by, the aunt is repeatedly confronted by demands for a custody
order to obtain medical care for the child, justify a larger apartment
from the public housing authorities, or convince her employer to provide insurance for the child. When the child is eleven years old, the
that Justice Brennan noted three decades ago. See Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431
U.S. 494, 509–10 (1977). Compared to the rate for non-Hispanic whites, AsianAmerican grandparents are three times more likely to live with grandchildren; American Indian, Alaska Native, black, and Latino grandparents are four times more likely;
and Pacific Islanders are five times more likely. See TAVIA SIMMONS & JANE
LAWLER DYE, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, GRANDPARENTS LIVING WITH GRANDCHILDREN: 2000 2 (2003), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/
2003pubs/c2kbr-31.pdf. See generally KINSHIP REPORT, supra note 10, at 17.
Among families with live-in grandparents, black, American Indian and Alaska Native
grandparents are more likely to be children’s primary caregivers. SIMMONS &
LAWLER DYE, supra note 25, at 3 tbl.1 (52%, of live-in black grandparents are their
grandchildren’s primary caretaker, compared with 42% of live-in grandparents
nationally).
26. CHILDREN’S LIVING ARRANGEMENTS AND CHARACTERISTICS: 2002, supra note
18, at 3. This figure excludes the 235,000 foster children listed in this report; the 2.5
million figure is the sum of the remaining numbers of children listed as living with
“neither parent.” Id. at 2 tbl.1.
27. Id. at 2 tbl.1.
28. SIMMONS & LAWLER DYE, supra note 25, at 3.
29. About 500,000 children live in foster care. ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES,
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., AFCARS REPORT: PRELIMINARY ESTIMATES FOR FY 2006 (2008), http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/stats_research/afcars/tar/report14.htm [hereinafter AFCARS REPORT] .
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mother reappears and demands custody, and the child does not want to
be separated from the only caretaker he has ever known.
This situation is perhaps the easiest case to decide a third party
custody dispute. The child’s psychological parent30 is plainly his
aunt; nobody else has taken on anything approximating a primary
caretaker role. The aunt is the person who raised the child and has
been his parent in everything but name. This fact pattern applies just
as strongly regardless of who the third party is—a grandparent, another relative, stepparent, god-parent or anyone else.
A startling case in the District of Columbia demonstrates how
long-term primary caregivers need the ability to obtain custody to protect children.31 Bessie Lee Lewis raised her grandson, Dontayvious
“Tay-Tay” Greene from birth until he turned 11. Tay-Tay visited with
his mother occasionally, but he had no doubt who his primary caretaker and psychological parent was. In a letter, 11 year old Tay-Tay
wrote, “My grandmother is my mother.” But when Lewis sought custody of Tay-Tay to obtain a public benefit that required a custody
order, Tay-Tay’s mother, Luvenier Lawson, reacted with fury, threatening to burn Lewis’s home. Lawson arrived at Lewis’s door and
demanded custody. Lewis called the police and the child welfare authorities. Unfortunately, without a custody order, the authorities would
do nothing. Lewis then filed an emergency motion for custody, but
the judge denied her motion and dismissed her case, ruling that because Lewis was a third party, “the court does not have the authority

30. The phrase “psychological parent” derives from the influential work of Joseph
Goldstein, Albert J. Solnit, Sonja Goldstein and Anna Freud. See, e.g., GOLDSTEIN
ET. AL., THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD: THE LEAST DETRIMENTAL ALTERNATIVE,
supra note 21, at 81 (asserting standard that “a child’s relationship with her psychological parents . . . must not be interrupted”).
31. For a summary of this case, see Arthur Delaney, Elder Hostile: Court Decision
Threatens D.C.’s Grandparent Custodians, WASH. CITY PAPER, Dec. 6, 2006, at 13,
available at http://www.washingtoncitypaper.com/printerpage.php?id=289. In the
spirit of full disclosure, another attorney in my office and I consulted with the lead
attorney representing Lewis, in her ultimately fruitless effort to regain custody of TayTay. We frequently cite this case to demonstrate the need for D.C.’s third party custody statute, which was enacted in July 2007, and is discussed further below.
Other examples exist. See Safe and Stable Homes for Children and Youth Act of
2007: Hearing on B17-0041 Before the Comm. on Human Servs. of the D.C. Council,
17th Sess. (D.C. 2007) [hereinafter D.C. Council Comm. B17-0041] (testimony of
Brenda Carpenter) (explaining how her grandchildren’s neglectful mother forcibly
regained custody before the grandmother was able to obtain legal custody). See also
D.C. Council Comm. B17-0041, supra (testimony of Alice Payne) (describing how
her grandson’s father “dropped him off” when he was ten months old, and returned
two years later and used the child to steal items from stores).
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to take custody of a child away from a parent and give it to a
nonparent.”32
2. Third Parties Who Share Significant Childrearing Tasks with a
Parent
About 11 million children live with both a third party and a parent. The variety of living arrangements appears to be quite significant. Although grandparents are easily the largest number—about 6.2
million of the almost 14 million children who live with third parties
live with grandparents34—they are far from the only category. 4.7
million children live with an aunt or uncle and 3.8 million live with
some other relative.35
A significant number of these children are primarily cared for by
the third party. In 2000, the Census Bureau measured the number of
grandparents raising their children’s children—and the result is astounding: 2.4 million grandparents were living with grandchildren and
were primarily responsible for raising them.36 Many other third parties likely share significant child rearing tasks with a parent.37
Court cases reveal another common pattern: children living temporarily with a third party when the parent deals with their own mental
health crises or battles drug addiction and then returning to the parent.38 In the two types of situations described above, third parties
share childrearing duties, sometimes alternating with parents and
sometimes sharing duties on more of a day-to-day basis.
Stepparents fit into this category as well; 4.3 million children
lived with stepparents in 2000.39 Many stepparents share child-rearing tasks with the child’s parent for years. If the adult couple breaks
33

32. Lewis v. Lawson, Case No. DR 3117-06, Order (docketed Oct. 31, 2006) (citing
W.D. v. C.S.M., 906 A.2d 317 (D.C. 2006)). W.D. led to the passage of D.C.’s third
party custody statute, which would presumably have led to a different conclusion for
Lewis and Tay-Tay.
33. The Census Bureau estimated the 2001 figure to be 13,851,000, excluding foster parents. LIVING ARRANGEMENTS OF CHILDREN: 2001, supra note 9, at 11 tbl.8.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. SIMMONS & LAWLER DYE, supra note 25, at 1.
37. Many third parties living with parents and children will not share significant
child rearing tasks, and would not fall in this category.
38. See, e.g., In re R.A. and J.M., 891 A.2d 564, 568 (N.H. 2005) (describing how
the child had spent about half of her life in her grandmother’s home and half in her
mother’s home).
39. ROSE M. KREIDER, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, ADOPTED
CHILDREN AND STEPCHILDREN: 2000 2 tbl.1 (2003), available at http://www.census.
gov/prod/2003pubs/censr-6.pdf. Stepparents generally become involved in custody
disputes with parents when their relationships end or when a parent dies and a non-
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up, then the stepparent might seek custody.40 If a parent dies, a stepparent might engage in a custody fight with the parent’s former partner.41 Other commentators have aptly described some of the
intellectual acrobatics—not always convincing and not always successful—required in states without clearly defined third party custody
standing for stepparents.42
Other common situations fall into this category. Consider same
sex partners raising a child from birth or adoption43 where only one of
the partners has adopted the child or only one of the partners is the
biological parent (as is the case with a child conceived through artificial insemination). If the biological parent dies or if the relationship
ends, then the non-biological parent ought to have standing to seek
custody.44 Also, consider the case of a man who raises a child as his
own, believing the child to be his offspring. Years later, he learns that
the child was the product of an affair and is the biological child of
another man. He nonetheless loves the child as his own and considers
himself the father, and the child considers him his father. The father
custodial parent demands custody. See In re Custody of Shields, 136 P.3d 117 (Wash.
2006).
40. See, e.g., Olvera v. Superior Court, 815 P.2d 925 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991) (stepmother sought custody of husband’s biological child claiming she was the child’s
primary caretaker for the majority of his life).
41. See, e.g., In re Shields, 136 P.3d 117 (Wash. 2006) (involving a custody dispute
between a stepparent and the surviving biological parent).
42. See, e.g., Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status:
The Need for Legal Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed,
70 VA. L. REV. 879, 914–15 (1984) (describing how some courts have ignored jurisdictional barriers in stepparent custody decisions); Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child
Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet the Needs of Children in
Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Families, 78 GEO. L.J. 459, 476–77 (1990)
(noting that although some stepparents “clearly” function as parents, they cannot attain parental legal status unless the parental rights of the noncustodial biological parent are terminated).
43. When a same-sex partner raises one of the partner’s children from a previous
relationship, the non-biological partner is precisely like a stepparent and should be
analyzed as such.
44. In situations in which partners planned to have children together and raised the
child together, the non-biological parent partner operates much like a parent—the
only distinction is the sexual orientation of the partner, which, from the child’s perspective, presents no difference from heterosexual parents. Such partners thus should
be treated as parents, not third parties. See, e.g., D.C. CODE §§ 16-831.01(1), 16831.03 (2008) (defining such partners as “de facto parents” and instructing courts to
treat them as parents in custody matters); PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, § 2.03(1)(c) (Tentative Draft No. 4,
2000). A full exploration of the family law involving same sex couples is beyond the
scope of this Article. It suffices for my purposes to note that current law treats nonbiological parent partners as third parties and, at the very least, these people with
strong roles in children’s lives ought to have standing to seek custody.
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in all but genetics should be able to seek custody if he and the mother
break up, as might occur after the news of the child’s parentage is
broken.45
Put in psychological terms, these cases involve third parties
closely bonded to the child through their significant caregiving role
which has been shared with a legal parent.46 Sharing caregiving roles
places the third party in an immensely important position to the child.
Depending on how the adults divide the caregiving roles, the third
party can be a primary caregiver, or sometimes the sole primary
caregiver. The child’s bond with the third party can be as strong, or
stronger, as the child’s bond with the parent. Even when the third
party’s bond to the child is less than primary, they are part of the “full
network of kin attachments” that previous commentators have encouraged the law to respect.47 Much research on children’s bonding
and attachment concludes that children form significant bonds with
multiple individuals.48 Identifying the “primary” or single “psychological parent”—especially at the early, standing stage of litigation—
imposes what for many children is an arbitrary label on a single person, at the exclusion of other important figures. A more accurate
description of many family structures would recognize a set of significant caretakers.
Despite the importance of these third party caregivers, their role
as a descriptive matter is often subordinate to a parent’s. And, legally,
the Constitution will presume that to be the case, as will be discussed
in Part IV. But third parties with significant caregiving roles, when
those caregiving roles were shared with the parents, should win custody in three general sets of situations. First, third parties should win
45. If the father was married to the mother, some states might consider him the
father regardless of biological parentage. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 100
(1989) (upholding California law presuming man married to mother to be her child’s
father). But not all states do so, and this situation could occur just as easily outside
the bonds of marriage.
The American Law Institute’s Draft Principles regarding custody cases would deem
such a man to be a “parent by estoppel” and would give him status as a parent. See
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, § 2.03(b)(ii), 204–08 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2000).
46. I do not include in this category third parties who are paid to take care of children. The bonds of family and personal relationships trump the bonds of economics;
babysitters, nannies, and au pairs need not be provided standing. The District of Columbia has explicitly excluded those paid by parents to take care of children from
seeking custody. D.C. CODE § 16-831.02(a)(2) (2008).
47. See Peggy Cooper Davis, The Good Mother: A New Look at Psychological
Parent Theory, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 347, 350 (1996).
48. Id. at 354–62 (summarizing the research on how children bond with multiple
individuals).
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custody when their caretaking role is so primary that the child has
formed significantly stronger attachments to the third party than to the
parent. If a stepparent or grandparents performs nearly all the daily
tasks of child rearing while a parent is largely absent, and parental
custody would threaten to take the child away from that primary caretaker, then parental custody may very well harm the child and third
party custody (or some more modest remedy, such as third party visitation) may be appropriate. Second, if the parent is absent when the
third party needs to obtain services for the child—services that require
the parent’s consent—then the third party may need at least joint custody to care for the children. Third, if the parent, left with sole legal
authority over the child, would abuse or neglect the child such that the
harm of legal intervention represents a necessary cost to protect the
child, then third party custody may be necessary. If the third party’s
shared caretaking role stems from some limited parenting capacity by
the parent,49 then third party custody can protect the child from neglect that may flow from that diminished capacity.
3. Third Parties Who Are Not Long-Term Caretakers, but Are
Suddenly Placed in a Primary Caregiving Role
A significant percentage of third parties who are primary caretakers of children have not had that role for a significant period of time.50
The statistics cited in Parts I.A.1 and I.A.2 represent the Census’ snapshot of American families—the numbers of children who, at a specific
moment, lived with third parties. The census data also indicates that
the number of children who, at some point in their childhood, live
with third parties is significantly greater. The census data reveals that
many children primarily cared for by grandparents have had that arrangement for a relatively short amount of time. The largest proportion of children, 38.5%, had been raised by a grandparent for five
years or more, but 22.9% of children primarily cared for by a grandparent had been in that grandparent’s care for less than one year.51
That such a significant percentage had been raised by grandparents for
a relatively short time suggests that a large number of children may
49. I suggested above, supra note 38 and accompanying text, that many third parties share child rearing duties due to a parent’s drug addiction or mental illness. See
NAT’L ABANDONED INFANTS ASSISTANCE RESOURCE CTR., UNIV. OF CAL. AT BERKELEY, LITERATURE REVIEW: EFFECTS OF PRENATAL SUBSTANCE EXPOSURE ON INFANT
AND EARLY CHILDHOOD OUTCOMES 2 (2006), available at http://aia.berkeley.edu/publications/monographs.php (noting that substance abuse may lead to primary caregiver
instability) [hereinafter LITERATURE REVIEW].
50. See SIMMONS & LAWLER DYE, supra note 25, at 8.
51. See id., at 3 tbl.1 (“by duration of care”).
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move back and forth from parent to third party (or even third party to
third party) over the course of their childhood. That reality suggests,
in turn, that the Census’ estimation of the number of children raised by
third parties at a particular moment does not account for the larger
number of children raised by third parties at different points in their
childhood.
When a third party has been a primary caretaker for even a short
period of time, the child’s needs may require them to step into that
role quickly. Such situations arise in several common ways. A parent
may die.52 A parent may have a debilitating illness.53 A parent may
leave a child with the third party and disappear unexpectedly. A parent may become unable to care for children for extended periods of
time, due to incarceration,54 extended inpatient treatment,55 or deployment abroad.56 Third parties might also obtain custody from another
third party caregiver as the initial third party caregiver ages and becomes ill. During the course of the life of a child raised by a third
party, some children will live through that third party’s death or

52. The death of a parent may trigger the application of probate statutes, without
necessitating any new third party custody statutes. A primary caretaker parent’s death
may set off a dispute between a third party and the surviving parent, especially if the
third party has had more involvement with the child than the surviving parent. The
structures described in this Article—whether through a probate statute or elsewhere—
should govern such disputes. Even where probate statutes would handle some situations, they do not handle the situations described above.
53. Some states have begun to provide tools for parents in these situations, permitting parents to identify “standby guardians” to care for their children if an illness
debilitates them. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-4801 to -4810 (LexisNexis 2001).
54. See Darryl K. Brown, Cost-Benefit Analysis in Criminal Law, 92 CAL. L. REV.
323, 346–47 (2004) (discussing impact of incarceration on families).
55. More than 100,000 people were discharged in 2005 from long-term inpatient
substance abuse treatment. SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN.,
DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., TREATMENT EPISODE DATA SET: 2005, available at http://wwwdasis.samhsa.gov/teds05/TEDSD2k5TOC.htm (follow “Chapter 6.
Long-Term Residential Treatment Discharges: 2005” hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 7,
2009). The average length of stay for “long-term residential” treatment was 88.4 days
and some treatment stays were more than 1,000 days. SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL
HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., TREATMENT EPISODE
DATA SET: 2005, available at http://wwwdasis.samhsa.gov/teds05/TEDSD2k5TOC.
htm (follow “C.1 All discharges: Average length of stay in treatment (mean), maximum length of stay, and standard deviation of the mean, by type of service: TEDS
2005” hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 7, 2009).
56. See ABA, REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON PROTECTING THE RIGHTS OF
SERVICE MEMBERS 39 (2004), available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/down
loads/lamp/wgprsmreport.pdf (quoting a National Guard general’s identification of
child custody and visitation “the single greatest area of concern” for service members
deploying to battlefields or bases abroad).
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debilitating illness.57 This reality is particularly foreseeable given the
older age of many kinship caregivers,58 an actuarial reality that is particularly striking given the millions of grandparents and other older
individuals who take on a primary caregiving role.
Before the third party has established long-term primary
caregiver status, the child might have a particular medical need. Infants and other young children, especially those born prematurely or
exposed to drugs in utero,59 may have such needs before the third
party has been their caretaker long enough to be considered to have
filled a parental role. This concern is particularly apt for children living with third parties, who are significantly more likely to have a disability than other children.60 The North Carolina Supreme Court
described the background facts of one such case: A mother gave birth
prematurely and brought her child, who had developmental delays,
home to the child’s grandparents’ home. Before the child turned two
months old, the mother moved out, leaving the child behind. The
Court ruled that the grandparents properly obtained legal custody at
that point.61
One parent’s sudden inability to care for the child may impose a
burden on third parties to seek custody to prevent some harm from the
other parent, especially if the other parent is violent,62 and even more
so when that violence causes the disruption. One extreme case demonstrates the point: A child was raised by his mother, who had left the
child’s father soon after the child’s birth to escape the father’s violence, which was directed at her, the child, and others. The mother
was eventually murdered with the child present; all involved suspected
57. See, e.g., D.C. Council Comm. B17-0041, supra note 31 (statement of Johnnie
Washington) (witness in favor of the D.C. third party custody bill describing how her
children’s caregiver—the children’s grandmother—was shot and killed, and how she
was hopeful that another third party close with the children could obtain custody with
her consent).
58. See KINSHIP REPORT, supra note 10, at 21 (noting the health problems of
caregivers “associated with aging”).
59. A recent review of various studies concluded that “in-utero substance exposure
can leave children vulnerable to a number of developmental problems.” LITERATURE
REVIEW, supra note 49, at 1.
60. See supra note 16.
61. Adams v. Tessener, 550 S.E.2d 499, 505 (N.C. 2001).
62. Parental abuse is common, occurring hundreds of thousands of times each year.
More than one quarter of substantiated reports of child abuse and neglect involve
physical or sexual abuse, accounting for more than 200,000 cases annually. CHILDREN’S BUREAU, ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., CHILD MALTREATMENT 2005 xiv–xv (2007) available at http://www.
acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/pubs/cm05/cm05.pdf. The vast majority of perpetrators are
parents. Id. at 70.
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the father but could not prove it. The aunt could, however, prove that
the father had been violent towards her, the child’s mother, and others,
and that the child showed symptoms of severe trauma when in the
presence of the father. To protect the child from her father’s violence,
the aunt sought custody.63
In many situations involving a need for a third party to be a shortterm primary caretaker, a court custody order may be unnecessary.
Policymakers should consider less intrusive means of enabling third
party caregivers to obtain the services necessary to take care of the
child. One option is permitting parents to sign a custodial power of
attorney, authorizing a third party to rear the parent’s child in the parent’s absence.64 When the parent will return at a definite point—such
as after a military deployment or prison term—the parent and third
party can agree on a temporary arrangement without going to court.
However, the availability of temporary arrangements does not
obviate the need to permit third party caretakers access to courts. Parents may become absent without making such arrangements and, if the
third party later needs legal authority to obtain an important service
for the child, then custody becomes the only option. Furthermore, the
ability to reach consensual arrangements with one parent does not ensure the agreement of the other parent. Indeed, some custodial power
of attorney statutes are conspicuously silent on how to handle disputes
between parents when one seeks to transfer some parental authority to
a third party and the other seeks custody for him or herself.65 In cases
where a parent seeking custody is harmful to the children, the third
party needs access to court to protect them. We can reframe the court
case that ensues—a third party with the support of one parent against
the other parent—as a case between two parents, each with a universally accepted constitutional role, and this reframing diminishes the
analytical difficulty of third party custody.66

63. Newsom v. Riley, No. 3478-02 (D.C. Sup. Ct. Mar. 11, 2004). The trial court
awarded the aunt custody and the case is now on appeal; the father has challenged the
trial court’s jurisdiction to award the aunt custody. Appellant’s Br. 05-FM-371,
20–22, (Jul. 13, 2007).
64. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 21-2301 (2007).
65. See id. (permitting a “parent,” singular, to sign a custodial power of attorney
without reference to the other parent’s position).
66. The boundary between cases where one parent’s designation drives the third
party custody arrangement (creating more of a parent vs. parent situation) and when
the parent more passively acquiesces to the third party’s pursuit of custody (a third
party vs. parent situation) would likely prove tricky. A full exploration of whether
any such cases should be adjudicated as parent vs. parent disputes is beyond the scope
of this Article.
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4. When the State Has Removed a Child from His or Her Parent
Due to Parental Abuse or Neglect
All the previous categories involve situations in which third parties should have the ability to go to court to seek custody of children
with whom they have a significant connection. I now address a narrower and more difficult category, based on the relationship between
the parent and the child and the state’s intervention in that relationship
through an abuse or neglect case. In such situations, third party standing should depend on either the parent’s consent to the third party’s
suit or state intervention in the parent-child relationship. When a parent abuses or neglects a child and the state has justifiably removed the
child from the parent’s care,67 then third party custody presents one
means to protect the child and the child’s family from the many
problems involved in the neglect system, without returning the child to
an abusive or neglectful home.68
When a child is in the state agency’s legal custody,69 typically
termed “foster care,” the state executive authorities determine where
the child lives, typically in a foster home or a group home. At any
given moment, about 500,000 children live in foster care.70 Many of
these children will reunify with their parents,71 but for the children
who do not reunify with their parents, the state looks to other options,
leaving tens of thousands of children in state care for years.72 While
in foster care, most children are separated from family members; in
67. Significant debate exists whether state child neglect systems remove children
from their parents and other primary caregivers more often than necessary. See Martin Guggenheim, Somebody’s Children: Sustaining the Family’s Place in Child Welfare Policy, Review of Elizabeth Bartholet’s Nobody’s Children: Abuse and Neglect,
Foster Drift, and the Adoption Alternative, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1716, 1717, 1721–23
(2000) (reviewing ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, NOBODY’S CHILDREN: ABUSE AND NEGLECT, FOSTER DRIFT AND THE ADOPTION ALTERNATIVE (1999)). I am sympathetic to
those commentators who suggest the extremely intrusive step of removing children
from parents occurs far too frequently, but that step nonetheless must occur in a significant number of cases. Determining exactly when parental misconduct is so severe
as to warrant such intervention, whether through a third party custody case or through
state involvement, is beyond the scope of this Article.
68. By the “neglect system,” I refer to situations in which state authorities remove a
child from her parents’ custody due to abuse or neglect and place her in state custody
with judicial approval.
69. See, e.g. D.C. CODE § 16-2320(a)(3)(A) (2001).
70. AFCARS REPORT, supra note 29.
71. Judith Wildfire, Richard P. Barth & Rebecca L. Green, Predictors of Reunification, in CHILD PROTECTION: USING RESEARCH TO IMPROVE POLICY AND PRACTICE
155, 165 (Ron Haskins, Fred Wulczyun & Mary Bruce Webbs eds., 2007) (estimating
the reunification rate at forty-three percent).
72. According to the most recent federal data available, 36 percent of foster children had been in foster care for two years or more. AFCARS REPORT, supra note 29.
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fact, less than one quarter of foster children live with kin.73 Many
neglect cases eventually lead to the child being placed permanently
with a third party through adoption, guardianship or custody,74 but the
process leading to this result is often not the best means to protect
children and may be far more harmful to the child, the parent, and the
family than permitting a third party to sue for custody early in a neglect case. Commentators have noted the long-term goal of establishing private law alternatives to neglect cases, such as custody cases.75
Indeed, formal or informal custody with third party kin is already a
common means of avoiding the filing of a neglect case and resulting
involvement of child welfare agencies.76 States should permit broad
third party standing to seek custody once a neglect case has been
opened to help children and families find positive alternatives to and
quick exits from the neglect system.
The neglect system—without a concurrent custody case—is
problematic in several ways. Because the child is in state custody,
placements generally require the approval of the state agency, which
places significant power in the executive. If third party kin with existing bonds with children cannot seek custody directly in court, then
insufficient checks exist on this state power. Such checks are needed
because many child welfare agencies will refuse to place a child in a
home that does not obtain a foster care license, and the requirements
to obtain a foster care license can exclude otherwise appropriate third
parties, especially those with low incomes.77 Third parties with the
73. Id.
74. See, e.g., COUNCIL FOR COURT EXCELLENCE, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CHILD
WELFARE SYSTEM REFORM—A THIRD PROGRESS REPORT 18 (2006) (noting the hundreds of neglect cases closed by adoption, guardianship and custody). Many cases
also lead to reunification with the parent, as I will discuss below.
75. Donald N. Duquette, Looking Ahead: A Personal Vision of the Future of Child
Welfare Law, 41 U. MICH. J. OF L. REFORM 317, 352 (2008) (calling for development
of private law and “new concept of a preventative law” approach to create legalalternatives to neglect cases). See also Leigh Goodmark, KEEPING KIDS OUT OF THE
SYSTEM: CREATIVE LEGAL PRACTICE AS A COMMUNITY CHILD PROTECTION STRATEGY 31–40 (Sally Small Indada ed., 2001) (describing various legal services projects
that help third parties “formalize caregiving arrangements through court proceedings”); NAT’L ABANDONED INFANTS ASSISTANCE RESOURCE CTR., THE PSYCHOSOCIAL
WELL-BEING OF SUBSTANCE-AFFECTED CHILDREN IN RELATIVE CARE 1, 1–2 (2006)
(“[Through legal proceedings], the relatives are officially recognized as caregivers of
the children, while maintaining the children outside of the child welfare system.”).
76. See Richard P. Barth, et al., Kinship Care and Nonkinship Foster Care: Informing the New Debate, in CHILD PROTECTION: USING RESEARCH TO IMPROVE POLICY
AND PRACTICE 187 (Ron Haskins, Fred Wulczyn, & Mary Bruce Webb eds., 2007).
77. Recent federal legislation may mitigate this harm. The federal government will
now provide funding for kinship foster homes even when states waive certain licensing requirements, thus providing financial incentives for state agencies to apply more
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ability to raise a child and with an existing bond to that child could be
denied a license because their home is too small,78 because they have
a criminal record,79 or because they fail to meet some other requirement.80 When such a rejection occurs, the neglect system separates
children not only from their parents, but from all adults with whom the
child has a bond, including other family members, and forces them to
live in foster care or group homes. Research shows that children prefer to live with kin, and, when they are permitted to do so, are more
likely to live with siblings, less likely to be further abused or neglected, and less likely to endure multiple placement changes.81 Children’s security comes not only from a parent, “but from a familiar
milieu and a network of attachments,”82 and third party custody enables the child to maintain some significant connection to that network
better than foster care which can separate children from all existing
connections. Placing a child in foster care rather than third party custody with an adult to whom the child is already connected also imposes a systemic burden on neglect systems which have precious few
available foster homes.83
Second, even when a child welfare agency will place a child with
kin, the child may be forced to wait for extended periods of time in
foster care before being able to live with kin. Delays occur while the
third party obtains a foster care license, and can be exacerbated if the
third party lives across state lines, triggering a bureaucratic process
that can take months and often a year or more, imposing a weightier
burden on children living in cities close to state borders.84 This delay
can lead to the same harms that longer foster placements can create.
lenient standards to relatives seeking to become foster parents. Pub. L. 110-351
§ 104(a). It remains to be seen how this new provision will affect child welfare practice. This provision only affects state and local agency behavior and does not create a
judicial check on agency denial of a relative’s desire to take custody of a child in state
custody.
78. See, e.g., D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 29, § 6007.18 (2007) (providing square footage
guidelines for foster home licensing).
79. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(20)(A) (2000) (prohibiting states from giving “final approval” to a potential foster parent who has certain crimes in their background,
including crimes not directly related to child rearing).
80. See D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 29, § 6007 (2007) (listing multiple requirements kin
must meet prior to foster care licensure).
81. Barth et. al., supra note 76, at 187–88.
82. Cooper Davis, supra note 47, at 354.
83. See KINSHIP REPORT, supra note 10, at 12 (noting decline in number of available foster homes and resulting reliance on kinship placements).
84. This process is governed by the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC). Article III of the Compact requires a “sending agency” to obtain the
“receiving” state’s approval before sending a child across state lines. ASS’N OF
ADM’RS OF THE INTERSTATE COMPACT ON THE PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN, TEXT OF

R
R
R
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Third, a neglect case can harm parents more severely than a custody case. Upon determining that a parent has neglected a child, a
child welfare agency can place the parent on the abuse and neglect
registry, which can limit job opportunities for the abusive parent.85
When a neglect case is opened, the child welfare agency and the court
oversee visitation between children and parents; as a result, parents
may receive less visitation rights than might have been negotiated directly between the parents and a third party. As a neglect case proceeds, if a third party cannot assume long-term caregiving
responsibilities, parental rights may be terminated permanently. In
fact, strict time limits are now placed on parents’ rehabilitation attempts.86 A custody case, in contrast, will not terminate a parent’s
rights; continued visitation and the opportunity to modify the custody
order if circumstances change will remain.87
Recognizing the potential harm resulting from neglect cases, state
policy makers should provide families with the option of resolving the
situation through third party custody arrangements. Parents may
choose to consent to a third party’s custody petition rather than expose
THE INTERSTATE COMPACT ON THE PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN, available at http://icpc.
aphsa.org/Home/articles.asp (last visited Aug. 11, 2007) [hereinafter COMPACT]. For
an examination of one of the various policy harms that arise when a child requires a
foster care placement across state lines, see Vivek S. Sankaran, Out of State and Out
of Luck: The Treatment of Non-Custodial Parents Under the Interstate Compact on
the Placement of Children, 25 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 63, 65–66 (2006). This burden
is felt particularly strongly in D.C., which is separated by state lines from all of its
suburbs. CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF SOC. POLICY, LASHAWN A. V. FENTY: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA’S CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM 7–8 (2007). Similar
problems are likely to occur in other metropolitan areas that sit on state lines, including New York City, Philadelphia, Memphis, St. Louis, Kansas City, Texarkana, and
Cincinnati. Custody cases should provide an exception to Interstate Compact requirements. ICPC Article III(a) applies the compact to foster care and adoptive placements
only; private custody suits are seemingly exempt. See COMPACT, supra. But some
courts have extended the Compact’s reach. See In re T.M.J., 878 A.2d 1200, 1202 n.2
(D.C. 2005) (holding that application of Compact provisions to a custody case filed
within the context of a neglect case was “indisputably correct.”). To permit a custody
case to protect children from the harms of an ongoing neglect case, the Compact
should be limited to the plain language of its text.
85. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 4-1302.03 (2001) (provision related to limited employment opportunities for individuals placed on the “Child Protection Register”).
86. 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E) (Supp V. 2005) (requiring states, in most cases, to seek
to terminate parental rights of individuals whose children have been in foster care for
15 of the previous 22 months). According to the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services, parental rights to more than 70,000 were terminated in each of the
years reported, either through termination of parental rights motions or adoptions.
DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., TRENDS IN FOSTER CARE AND ADOPTION, FY
2002 – FY 2007 (2008), available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/stats_research/afcars/trends_02-06.pdf.
87. D.C. CODE §§ 16-831.10 to .11 (Supp. 2008).
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themselves and their children to the harms described above. Indeed,
some courts have recognized parents’ constitutional right to have a
strong voice in where their child lives, even when the child is removed
from their custody due to their own conduct.88 The state should investigate potential kinship placements when it determines that removal is
necessary.89 When an appropriate kinship placement is available, the
state should inform that kin of his or her legal options. That kin—if
state law permits—could then file for custody, sparing the child and
the family the difficulties of the neglect system. Some state welfare
agencies already engage in this practice,90 and have identified particular customs, such as family group conferences, that can facilitate third
party custody in lieu of an open neglect case.91
The state may maintain an important mediating role in such
cases. If the state has reason to believe that custody arrangements
between a parent and a third party place the child in harm’s way, either through a third party incapable of adequately raising the child, or
through a third party who will return the child to a harmful parent,
then the state can seek to prosecute a neglect petition or seek an alternative disposition to the parent’s choice of third party custodian. The
state, of course, would have to marshal sufficient evidence to prove
that the parent’s choice of caretaker is inadequate. Because custody is
not state-managed foster care, the state could not argue against third
party custody on the grounds that the third party could not obtain a
foster care license for reasons unrelated to child safety.
State involvement can also provide two crucial benefits that private custody cases, absent a concurrent neglect case, do not: many and
perhaps most states provide legal representation to parents when the
state opens a neglect case,92 and state neglect systems must provide
service coordination to aid reunification with parents. Legal representation for a parent is particularly important when a third party seeks to
break up that parent’s existing custodial relationship with his or her
88. See In re T.J., 666 A.2d 1, 11 (D.C. 1995) (holding that “unless it is established
that the parent is not competent to make such a decision . . . a parent’s choice of a fit
custodian for the child must be given weighty consideration”).
89. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15) (2000) (outlining federal requirement to make reasonable efforts to identify kin).
90. See, e.g., KARIN MALM & ROB GREEN, THE URBAN INST., WHEN CHILD WELFARE AGENCIES RELY ON VOLUNTARY KINSHIP PLACEMENTS 2 (2003) (“Central to
caseworker practice in Alabama is an agency philosophy that keeping families out of
the system is better for them . . . .”).
91. Id.
92. Leslie Starr Heimov et al., The Rise of the Organizational Practice of Child
Welfare Law: The Child Welfare Office, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 1097, 1099–1100
(2007). See also, D.C. CODE § 16-2304 (2001 & Supp. 2008).
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child on the basis of the parent’s alleged abuse or neglect, rather than
previously-established bonds to the third party or the third party’s existing significant caregiving role. The real-world value of an attorney
provided by neglect systems may not be great,93 but there can be little
doubt that the presence of counsel for parents can protect the parentchild relationship from an overzealous third party and/or an overzealous state agency.
Neglect cases also include mandatory state-provided services,
such as mental health and addiction recovery services, and as a result,
many children reunify with their parents.94 Such services do not justify keeping a neglect case open; parents should have access to necessary services for themselves and their children, regardless of the
child’s legal status or the existence of a neglect case. Neglect cases
represent an extremely cost-inefficient means of providing services,
and the neglect system often cannot force other agencies to provide
services beyond what the parent would be eligible for absent the neglect case.95 The crucial piece that the neglect system will add is a
social worker required to assist the parent in obtaining necessary services, court oversight to help ensure that the social worker does so,
and legal pressure to encourage the parent to comply with such
services.
How to balance the potential harms and benefits of a neglect case
varies from situation to situation. Policymakers, however, should follow the following generalization: When a parent consents to a third
party’s custody suit or when the state has determined that it must open
a neglect case, then a significant risk exists that the neglect system
will do more harm to the child than good, and states should open the
93. Professor Peggy Cooper Davis, a former family court judge, described the quality of parents’ legal representation in blunt terms: “Parents are pathetically represented. People barely conscious were standing before me representing parents.”
Caught by Good Intentions, LAW SCH. (N.Y.U. Sch. of Law, New York, N.Y.), Autumn 2007, at 48.
94. “For the youngest children, parental participation in parenting support services
increases the relative rate of reunification sevenfold, suggesting that there are available mechanisms for addressing some of the achievement of permanency.” Judith
Wildfire, Richard P. Barth & Rebecca L. Green, Predictors of Reunification, in CHILD
PROTECTION: USING RESEARCH TO IMPROVE POLICY AND PRACTICE 155, 166 (Ron
Haskins, Fred Wulczyun & Mary Bruce Webbs eds., 2007). A recent survey of
eleven states estimated that reunification was achieved in forty-three percent of cases,
with significant variation from state to state. Id. at 165. In addition, 215 cases were
closed due to parental reunification in D.C. in 2005. COUNCIL FOR COURT EXCELLENCE, supra note 74, at 18.
95. See In re G.G., 667 A.2d 1331 (D.C. 1995) (holding that a neglect judge lacks
authority to order agencies to do anything beyond their existing authorities, such as
provide immediate housing assistance to a particular family).
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door to third parties who offer a quick exit from that system. Although the government, as a party to a neglect case, can lend its support or opposition to any custody complaint filed, the neglect system
poses a sufficient risk that states should permit third parties to seek
custody in those situations.
B. Translating Demographic Data and Common
Situations into Policy
It is helpful to distill the above discussion into provisions that
will provide standing for all of the common situations discussed
above. Legislatures and courts should permit third parties to seek custody in the following situations:
(a) The third party has lived with and taken on a significant,
though not necessarily primary, caretaking role for the child, for 6 of
the previous 12 months;
(b) Either parent consents to the third party’s complaint;
(c) The third party lives with and has taken on a primary caretaking role for the child at the time of filing; or
(d) The state has removed the children from the parents’ custody
through a neglect case.
II.
TROXEL V. GRANVILLE 96
In the Supreme Court’s most recent and most relevant family law
opinion, a parent successfully appealed a trial court order granting her
child’s grandparents expanded visitation rights.97 Although the Court
ruled in the parent’s favor, Troxel is not a strong parents’ rights opinion, and has not led states to limit third parties’ access to court. Few
states have changed their laws in its aftermath, and some of those who
have—including Washington (whose law was at issue in Troxel) and
California, both discussed below—have done so in ways favorable to
third parties and close to what I advocate in this Article. Even in the
realm of third parties’ rights to visit children over parents’ objections—the specific issue raised before the Supreme Court—“Troxel
has induced no startling or radical changes with respect to third-party
visitation.”98
96. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
97. Id.
98. John DeWitt Gregory, The Detritus of Troxel, 40 FAM. L.Q. 133, 144 (2006).
Gregory’s conclusion is that the “detritus of Troxel” is, essentially, “not very much,”
at least in terms of actual changes in law and practice in the states. See id. at 147
(noting the lack of “significant changes in the legal landscape”). At least one post-
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Despite its limited impact, Troxel provides the constitutional
framework for disputes between third parties and parents, and thus the
framework for turning the demographic data and case studies discussed in the previous section into constitutional policy. Further, the
various Troxel opinions include important lessons for setting such policies. Specifically, as developed further below, the various Troxel
opinions recognized the ability of states to protect the interests of third
parties and children with significant relationships so long as states
grant parents a substantive presumption that they act in their children’s best interests. Troxel involved a petition for visitation filed
under a Washington statute by the paternal grandparents, Jenifer and
Gary Troxel, of two children who lived with their mother, Tammie
Granville. The statute allowed anyone to sue for visitation rights and
only required them to establish that such rights would serve the child’s
best interests.99 After the children’s father—the petitioners’ son—
died, Granville limited the grandparents’ visitation and the grandparents sought expanded visitation.100 The trial judge determined that
expanded visits served the children’s best interests and ruled for the
Troxels.101 The Supreme Court, in a split decision, ruled the visitation
rights statute unconstitutional as applied. Justice O’Connor wrote the
lead opinion for the Court on behalf of herself, Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Ginsburg and Justice Breyer. Justices Souter and
Thomas each wrote concurring opinions, and Justices Stevens, Scalia
and Kennedy dissented.
O’Connor’s plurality opinion began with an important and oftenoverlooked recognition of a strong state interest in supporting and protecting children’s relationships with third parties, especially as the frequency of family arrangements involving third parties increases.
O’Connor noted that “[t]he demographic changes of the past century
make it difficult to speak of an average American family.”102 With
literally millions of third parties building strong relationships with
children nationally, the Court recognized that states have a strong and
legitimate interest in “protecting the relationships those children form

Troxel petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court has noted continuing divide among
states in the standards applied to visitation disputes between third parties and parents.
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Fausey v. Hiller, No. 06-863, at 11–20 (2006), available at http://www.law.virginia.edu/pdf/supct/fausey_cert.pdf, cert denied, 127 S. Ct.
1876 (2007).
99. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.10.160(3) (1994).
100. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 60–61.
101. Id. at 61.
102. Id. at 63.
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with such third parties.”103 Justice Stevens’ opinion took this proposition further, suggesting children have a right to maintain significant
relationships.104 Justice Kennedy also noted the large numbers of
third parties significantly involved in children’s lives and how they
might have rights “not necessarily subject to absolute parental
veto.”105 Stevens would have also recognized the state policymakers’
ability “to assess in the first instance” to balance the “conflicting interests” in disputes between third parties, parents, and children.106 Taken
together, the plurality, Justice Stevens and Justice Kennedy represented six votes that, at the very least, recognized that states have
some interest in protecting children’s connections to third parties with
whom they have significant relationships, and presumably that states
could enact an appropriately tailored statute to protect these
relationships.
O’Connor also reiterated the well-established constitutional right
of parents “to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children.”107 The question, then, was whether the statute
as applied appropriately balanced the state’s interest in protecting the
relationships between children and third parties with parents’ rights to
control access to their children. The trial court erred, O’Connor explained, because the “parent’s decision that visitation would not be in
the child’s best interest [wa]s accorded no deference.”108 The Court
concluded that states must “accord at least some special weight” to a
parent’s position and apply a “presumption that a fit parent will act in
the best interest of his or her child.”109 Rather than wrestle with this
presumption, the trial court’s decision reflected a “mere disagreement”
with Granville’s parenting choice “and nothing more.”110
The plurality then declined to decide whether the Constitution
requires third parties to prove that the child would be harmed without
visitation, leaving that constitutional question and other decisions to
future case-by-case adjudication.111
103. Id. at 64.
104. Id. at 88–89 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
105. Id. at 98 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 90 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The plurality opinion voiced some sympathy
for permitting states to develop standards in family law, noting that “much state-court
adjudication in this context occurs on a case-by-case basis,” and thus not making per
se decisions about standards that must be applied. Id. at 73 (O’Connor, J., plurality
opinion).
107. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 66.
108. Id. at 67.
109. Id. at 69.
110. Id. at 68.
111. Id. at 73.
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The Troxel Court’s “presumption that a fit parent will act in the
best interest of his or her child” raised the question of which substantive standard to apply to rebut this presumption and leads to two conclusions.112 First, a fit parent can lose a case to a third party—a fit
parent is only entitled to a rebuttable presumption. Second, implicitly,
an unfit parent may be entitled to no presumption.113 Accordingly, a
third party can defeat a parent by proving either that the parent is
unfit, or by meeting some other, less clearly delineated standard.
O’Connor made clear that the trial court’s application of the
wrong substantive standard—and only that error—sustained the
Court’s ruling.114 O’Connor noted that Washington state’s
nonparental visitation statute, which permitted anyone to sue for visitation at any time, was “breathtakingly broad.”115 This oft-quoted
phrase,116 however, did not form the basis for O’Connor’s decision,
which turned instead on the substantive standard applied under this
statute. Professor Martin Guggenheim, a leading parents’ rights advocate has concluded that “the overbreadth of the law, as applied, had
nothing to do with who could sue.”117 Instead, “the fatal defect in the
application of the statute was the substantive basis upon which the
trial court was permitted to order visitation over a parent’s
objection.”118
Finally, the plurality granted final judgment for Granville, declining to remand the case for further proceedings.119 The plurality noted
“the burden of litigating a domestic relations proceeding,” a burden
which Granville had already borne in the Washington court system
and the Supreme Court, as one reason not to force Granville to litigate
the case further.120 This statement arose in the context of the Court’s
decision not to remand the case; the plurality, however, said nothing
112. Id. at 69.
113. See id. at 68 (noting that the Troxels made no claim that Granville was unfit,
and this fact “is important, for there is a presumption that fit parents act in the best
interests of their children”).
114. Id. at 69 (“The problem here is not that the Washington Superior Court intervened, but that when it did so, it gave no special weight at all to Granville’s determination of her daughters’ best interests.”).
115. Id. at 67.
116. LEXIS searches reveal 119 articles and 88 cases discussing Troxel that quote
the “breathtakingly broad” phrase. (LEXIS searches were performed on Aug. 23,
2008).
117. MARTIN GUGGENHEIM, WHAT’S WRONG WITH CHILDREN’S RIGHTS 22 (2005).
118. Id. at 23.
119. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 75.
120. Id.
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about whether the burden of litigating might affect any analysis about
who might have standing to file suit.
Justice Souter concurred separately, stating that he would have
upheld the decision that the statute’s broad standing coupled with the
best interests standard rendered the visitation statute unconstitutional.121 Souter’s opinion does not, however, directly condemn either
the statute’s standing provision or its substantive standard. It instead
found that the interaction of the two made the statute unconstitutional.
Justice Souter left open the question whether, for instance, a statute
with broad standing but a stricter substantive standard would satisfy
the Constitution.
Justice Stevens dissented. Without focusing on the particular
facts of the case and instead addressing the facial holdings of the
Washington Supreme Court, Stevens would have found the statute
facially sound despite the challenges to its standing provision and substantive standards.122 Regarding standing, Stevens noted that even
though anyone could sue, strangers to a child would not likely sue.
“[T]here are plainly any number of cases—indeed, one suspects, the
most common to arise—in which the ‘person’ among ‘any’ seeking
visitation is a once-custodial caregiver, an intimate relation, or even a
genetic parent.”123 Accordingly, a facial challenge would not be appropriate, even under Stevens’ relatively broad view of when such
challenges are appropriate.124 Stevens went on to delineate when he
thought that the constitutional rights of parents applied, at least in their
strongest manner. “A parent’s rights with respect to her child have . . .
never been regarded as absolute, but rather are limited by the existence of an actual, developed relationship with a child, and are tied to
121. Id. at 76–77 (Souter, J., concurring).
122. Id. at 81 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
123. Id. at 85 (emphasis added).
124. See id. (“I believe that a facial challenge should fail whenever a statute has ‘a
plainly legitimate sweep’ ”) (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,
739–40 & n.7 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens compares his more
lenient standard for facial challenges with “the far more stringent demands” enunciated by the majority in United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987), which
requires that “no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid.”
Troxel, 530 U.S. at 85 & n.6 (quoting Salerno). Professor Guggenheim cites Stevens’
citation to Salerno to suggest that the only reason the majority did not declare the
Washington statute’s standing provision to be unconstitutionally overbroad in Troxel
was due to the Court’s narrow grounds for permitting facial challenges. See GUGGENHEIM, supra note 117, at 22–23 & n.31. The Glucksberg, “plainly legitimate sweep”
standard is Stevens’ preferred, looser standard and under it, Stevens would not respect
the facial challenge in Troxel. The four Justices in the plurality did not analyze the
case facially, creating a majority of the Court that, contrary to Guggenheim’s conclusion, would not find the statute’s standing provision unconstitutionally overbroad.
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the presence or absence of some embodiment of family.”125 When a
parent’s relationship to his or her child is weaker, or where the parent
is not a part of the “family” raising the child, the parent’s rights are
not so strong as to absolutely trump what is best for children. Children, Stevens added, “have fundamental liberty interests . . . and so,
too, must their interests be balanced in the equation.”126
Justice Kennedy dissented, arguing that third parties ought not be
required to demonstrate harm. Particularly outside the context of
traditional nuclear families, requiring a showing of harm might grant
parents too many rights in comparison with a third party who has developed a significant relationship with a child.127 Kennedy also noted
“that a domestic relations proceeding in and of itself can constitute
state intervention that is so disruptive of the parent-child relationship
that the constitutional right of a custodial parent to make certain basic
determinations for the child’s welfare becomes implicated.”128 Kennedy did not say whether he believed the unlimited standing provision
itself rendered the statute unconstitutional. Rather, he stated that he
would have remanded the case for a new determination regarding the
substantive standard, leaving the standing question for another day.129
Finally, Justices Thomas and Scalia each issued individual opinions demonstrating their contrarian view of substantive due process
cases, but without impacting the subsequent legal and policy
debates.130

125. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 88 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 97–98 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
128. Id. at 101.
129. Id. at 94–95.
130. Thomas, concurring, suggesting that state judges might not be empowered to
enforce unenumerated rights, such as parental rights, but noting that neither party
raised the issue so the issue, in his view, remained undecided. Id. at 80 (Thomas, J.,
concurring). Scalia dissented and indicated the parties’ decision not to raise that issue
would not stop him from deciding it. He would have ruled for the Troxels because, in
his view, parental rights were located in the Ninth Amendment (not substantive due
process) and that judges lacked authority to enforce such rights. Id. at 91–92 (Scalia,
J., dissenting). Thomas did also note that he would apply strict scrutiny to the statute
at issue because it affected fundamental constitutional rights. Id. at 80.
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III.
STANDING: WHY STATES SHOULD PERMIT BROAD
ACCESS TO THE COURTS TO SEEK
CUSTODY OF A CHILD
The law of third party standing in child custody cases is, in the
words of one commentator, “overwhelmingly confused.”131 Nearly
every state permits some third parties to seek custody of a child.132
Although the scope and public awareness of third party caregiving has
increased, courts have adjudicated custody disputes between third parties and parents for many decades.133 But decades of litigation and
policy-making have not led to a standard approach; states vary considerably in who they permit to seek custody of a child. The standing
question—more so than the substantive standard addressed in Troxel
or the burden of proof addressed in other Supreme Court cases involving parental rights134—divides states’ laws regarding third party custody. To resolve this divide, states with narrow standing rules should
broaden them.
This section will first explore the divide among states regarding
third party custody standing and critique their varying viewpoints. It
will then argue the first essential doctrinal point—that the Constitution
does not prevent states from permitting anyone to file for custody at
any time. This section will then, following the discussion in Part I,
explore the policy arguments supporting broad standing provisions
and rebut the counterarguments.

131. Polikoff, supra note 42, at 508.
132. By my count, only Wyoming does not permit third parties to seek custody. The
other forty-nine states and the District of Columbia do so via statutes or case law, and
are all cited in the text and footnotes, Part III.A infra. A full exploration of the varied
statutes, cases interpreting those statutes, and common law provisions in those fifty
jurisdictions is well beyond the scope of this Article. I will instead note some key
statutes and cases to identify the variety and general approach of those fifty
jurisdictions.
133. For example, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals cited a string of custody cases involving third parties over more than a century. W.D. v. C.S.M., 906
A.2d 317, 325 n.17 (D.C. 2006). One case common to many law school curricula,
Painter v. Bannister, 140 N.W.2d 152 (Iowa 1966), also involved a third party custody
claim. Accordingly, it is incorrect to say that custody cases “were always fights between legally recognized parents.” MARTIN GUGGENHEIM, WHAT’S WRONG WITH
CHILDREN’S RIGHTS, supra note 117, at 102.
134. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 746 (1982) (holding that a State
must support its allegations by clear and convincing evidence before severing the
rights of parents in their natural child).
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A. The Divide Among States
A brief survey of the wide variety of standing provisions among
the states demonstrates a lack of uniformity in approaching this issue,
and how some states’ limitations vary, sometimes dramatically, from
the needs of children and families discussed in Part I. Despite my
effort to categorize states in the sections that follow, it must be noted
that some states overlap categories; some states, for instance, may
limit who can file to certain relatives at certain times.135
1. States That Permit Essentially Unlimited Standing
Several states essentially permit anyone to file for custody of a
child, whether by statute or case law. California, in a statute enacted
after Troxel, authorizes courts to grant custody to “any other person or
persons deemed by the court to be suitable and able to provide adequate and proper care and guidance for the child.”136 Virginia grants
standing to any “person with a legitimate interest,” instructing courts
to construe that term “broadly . . . to accommodate the best interest of
the child,” and two other states have similarly broad language.137 In
Washington, a third party can seek custody if the child does not live
with either parent, or the third party “alleges that neither parent is a
suitable custodian.”138 In Maryland, the courts have often either
placed no limitations on third-party standing, or failed to address the
issue at all.139 Other states provide similarly.140
135. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 722.26c(1)(b) (2002 & Supp. 2008) (limiting third party standing to a broad set of relatives when the biological parents did not
marry each other and the custodial parent has died or gone missing).
136. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3040(a)(3) (Deering 2004).
137. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.1 (2004). See also MINN. STAT. §§ 257C.01(Subd.
3)(a), 257C.03(Subd.7)(a) (2005) (permitting an “interested third party” to seek custody); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 2645 (2002 & Supp. 2007) (permitting “a person
interested in the welfare of the minor” to seek custody in certain situations).
138. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.10.030(1) (2005). By requiring third parties to allege
the grounds on which they would be entitled to custody, Washington thus introduces a
pleading requirement. As discussed infra note 218 and accompanying text, such
pleading requirements can provide one modest check against frivolous suits.
139. See, e.g., McDermott v. Dougherty, 869 A.2d 751, 788 (Md. 2005). See also
Street v. Street, 731 So. 2d 1224 (Ala. 1999) (adjudicating custody dispute involving
grandparents without discussing any limits on third party standing); Richardson v.
Richardson, 766 So. 2d 1036, 1043 (Fla. 2000) (holding, despite voiding a third party
custody statute, that “any concerned party may seek the initiation of proceedings to
protect the well-being of the child”); Ogden v. Rath, 755 A.2d 795 (R.I. 2000) (adjudicating custody dispute between grandparent and parent without discussing any limits on third party standing).
140. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 721(e) (1999) (permitting custody cases between a
parent and “any other person”); HAW. REV. STAT. § 571-46(2) (2006) (permitting custody to “be awarded to persons other than the father or mother”); IND. CODE ANN.
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2. States That Limit Standing to Certain Relatives
Some states have chosen to permit only certain relatives to seek
custody of children. Typically, these states identify stepparents and
grandparents as individuals who can seek custody. For instance, New
York has enacted a statute permitting grandparents, and only grandparents, to assert “extraordinary circumstances,” including the fact
that they, and not the child’s parents, have been raising the child, to
justify granting custody to the grandparent.141 Texas permits a grandparent to seek custody of a child at any time.142 New Hampshire law
permits grandparents and stepparents to seek custody.143 Other states
have similar provisions.144
§ 31-17-2-3(2) (2006) (permitting “a person other than a parent” to petition for custody); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 133 (1999) (permitting custody to “any other person
able to provide an adequate and stable environment” for the child); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 19-A, § 1653(2)(C) (1998 & Supp. 2007) (stating that the court may award
parental rights to a third person); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-5-24(1)(e)(ii) (West 2007)
(permitting “any other person deemed by the court to be suitable and able to provide
adequate and proper care and guidance for the child” to be awarded custody); MO.
REV. STAT. § 452.375(5)(5)(a) (2000 & Supp. 2006) (permitting “any other person or
persons deemed by the court to be suitable and able to provide an adequate and stable
environment for the child” to obtain custody); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 125.480(3)(d)
(2007) (permitting the court to grant custody “[t]o any other person or persons whom
the court finds suitable and able to provide proper care and guidance for the child”);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-9 (West 2002) (permitting “any person interested in the welfare
of such child to institute an action” for custody); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-06.1
(2004) (providing for custody to “a person” who meets the substantive standard);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 21.1(A)(6) (West 2007) (permitting “[a]ny other person
deemed by the court to be suitable and able to provide adequate and proper care and
guidance for the child” to seek custody); In re Marriage of Reschly, 334 N.W.2d 720,
721 (Iowa 1983) (listing various types of third parties who can obtain custody under
common law).
141. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 72(2) (2008). New York case law, however, speaks
more broadly of suits for custody between parents and all third parties. That case law
imposes substantive requirements on what a third party must prove to prevail, but no
limitations on who may file. Bennett v. Jeffreys, 356 N.E.2d 277 (N.Y. 1976). A
non-grandparent third party might still be able to use common law causes of action to
seek custody.
142. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.432 (2006).
143. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 461-A:6(V) (2006); In re R.A. and J.M., 891 A.2d
564, 577 (2005) (holding that petitions for custody are limited to stepparents and
grandparents and noting that New Hampshire has avoided creating broad rules allowing for people with close, personal relationships to petition for custody).
144. Pennsylvania permits grandparents to seek custody when they have “assumed
the role and responsibilities of the child’s parent” for twelve months. 23 PA. CON.
STAT. § 5313(b) (2006). Illinois also permits stepparents who have taken care of children for a certain amount of time to seek custody in some circumstances. 750 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/601(3) (2006). Arkansas permits grandparents who have been
children’s primary caregiver for one continuous year (or six months if the child is
under one year old) to intervene in custody disputes between parents and seek custody
for themselves. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-13-101(a)(2)(B) (2006). Idaho permits a grand-
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On a political level, one can see the logic behind such choices.
These groups represent the largest categories of third parties living
with and caring for children, as discussed above.145 And it would be
politically difficult to take a stand against grandparents.146 Grandparents have proven repeatedly that they “have significant clout in the
state legislatures.”147 “One group stated that it would treat grandparents differently—permitting them greater access to court than any
other third party—for obvious reasons.”148
On a policy or philosophical level, however, limiting standing to
grandparents only (or to any specified relative) makes little sense. According to the census numbers listed above, more than 1.3 million
children live alone with third parties other than their parents,149 and
millions more live with their parents and third parties who are the
children’s primary caregivers.150 States that permit only certain relatives to seek custody exclude some portion of those millions of children from the scope of their third party custody statutes. If a
legislature wanted to favor grandparents, it could do so by instructing
courts to prefer grandparents over other third parties seeking custody,
without fully excluding other third parties.151 Even this method of
parent with whom “the child is actually residing . . . in a stable relationship” to seek
custody with “the same standing as a parent.” IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-717 (2008).
145. See supra notes 26–27 and accompanying text.
146. Some politically powerful groups have stepped in to support grandparents in
particular. This support extends beyond the custody arena to other burgeoning state
efforts to support third party caregivers. For instance, the District of Columbia established a novel program providing financial support to grandparents who are primary
caregivers to their grandchildren. D.C. CODE §§ 4-251.01 to .07 (2007). The local
chapter of the American Association of Retired Persons strongly endorsed the bill.
See AARP.org, District Council Passes Much Needed Grandparent Caregiver Subsidy, http://www.aarp.org/family/grandparenting/articles/district_council_passes_
muchneeded_grandparent_car.html (last visited Aug. 23, 2007). The Grandparent
Caregivers’ Pilot Program, as its name suggests, limits its benefits to those it defines
as grandparents. D.C. CODE § 4-251.01 (2007).
147. GUGGENHEIM, WHAT’S WRONG WITH CHILDREN’S RIGHTS, supra note 117, at
17. Professor Guggenheim notes the slippery slope down which many state legislatures slide—permitting first grandparents to sue, then other relatives, and then third
parties more broadly. Id. at 17–18. That slope is not a bad thing—it is the inevitable
result of drawing standing lines that are not based on principled distinctions.
148. American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers Model Third-Party (Non-Parental)
Contact Statute (with commentary), 18 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 1, 6 (2002)
[hereinafter Academy].
149. CHILDREN’S LIVING ARRANGEMENTS AND CHARACTERISTICS: 2002, supra note
18, at 13 tbl.10.
150. Supra notes 33–37 and accompanying text.
151. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 21.1(A) (West Supp. 2008) (ranking in
order of preference who may seek custody, with parents followed by grandparents,
followed by other relatives, and, finally, other third parties).
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favoring grandparents—while less harmful than excluding non-parents from court—is ill-advised. It seems impossible to conclude that
all grandparents should be favored over all other third parties without
considering the particular abilities and limitations of each grandparent
and the nature of any existing relationship between a child and grandparent, and comparing those factors with the other individuals in the
child’s life.
States should treat all third parties alike regardless of what formal
relationship they have with a child; such approach is consistent with
constitutional law. Under the Constitution, one is either a parent or
not; no Supreme Court case has distinguished the particular rights, if
any, held by a grandparent, aunt, uncle, godparent, or others. Indeed,
although Troxel cited some statistics unique to grandparents, Justice
O’Connor explicitly recognized states’ interest in protecting children’s
substantial relationship with “third parties,” not just grandparents.152
In other words, between grandparents and other third parties, all are
equally non-parents to the child. Their precise familial relationship
does not distinguish them.
Some states which determine standing by familial relationship
lessen its harm by permitting a particularly broad set of relatives to
sue. Georgia, for instance, permits a third party who is a “grandparent, great-grandparent, aunt, uncle, great aunt, great uncle [or] sibling”
to seek custody of a child.153 An Ohio statute permits a court to grant
custody to a relative of a child when neither parent is appropriate,
excluding only stepparents, godparents and other unrelated individuals.154 When a parent has died, Michigan permits third parties to sue
if, among other criteria, they are “related to the child within the fifth
degree.”155 This broader approach is far more appealing than a
“grandparents only” approach, but nonetheless fails because an individual’s familial relationship (or lack thereof) does not connect with
the reasons third party custody is important, discussed in Part I. Individuals who have a strong caregiving bond with a child or who are
best-situated to step up and care for the child due to a parent’s absence
may not have a formal familial relationship.

152. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 64 (2000).
153. GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-1(b.1) (Supp. 2008).
154. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.04(d)(2) (West Supp. 2008).
155. MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 722.26c(1)(b)(iii) (West Supp. 2008) (emphasis
added). See also WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 767.41(3)(a), 767.41(1)(a) (West 2007) (permitting a court to grant custody to “relatives” and suggesting third parties, related or
not, with physical custody might have a separate cause of action).
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The converse of this criticism is also true. Permitting all grandparents (or all aunts and uncles or any other category of relative) to
seek custody will permit some individuals with no substantial relationship to the child to seek custody. Securing a child’s relationship with
an individual with whom they do not have a relationship does not
serve any goal of third party custody discussed in Part I.B. Nor is
securing such relationships the province of the courts. As Martin
Guggenheim has written, “[t]here are few adults in American society
who would even attempt to advance the claim that a child’s right includes developing a substantial relationship with a particular
nonparent.”156 States should avoid the politically palatable pitfall of
granting standing to particular relatives.
3. States That Limit Standing to Existing Long-Term Caretakers
Another set of states permit third parties who have taken on a
role analogous to a typical parent’s role to seek custody. In Arizona,
third parties may seek custody in certain circumstances if they have
been acting “in loco parentis,”157 a term defined as “a person who has
been treated as a parent by the child and who has formed a meaningful
parental relationship with the child for a substantial period of time.”158
Other states limit third party standing to those who have similarly
formed a “parent-like” or “child-parent” relationship.159
As Arizona’s statute suggests, these states define third parties
who have established parent-like relationships quite narrowly. In addition to the Arizona language quoted above, Montana defines a
“child-parent relationship” as one “in which a person provides or provided for the physical needs of a child by supplying food, shelter, and
clothing and provides or provided the child with necessary care, education and discipline and which relationship continues or existed on a
156. GUGGENHEIM, supra note 117, at 118.
157. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-415(A)(1) (2006).
158. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-415(G)(1) (2006).
159. See Fish v. Fish, 939 A.2d.1040 (Conn. 2008). To have standing under Connecticut law, a third party seeking custody must show a “parent-like relationship” with
the child. Id. at 1053. The plaintiff in Fish, who the Connecticut Supreme Court held
satisfied the “parent-like relationship” standard, had cared for the teenage child for
extended portions of two years. Id. at 1044–45. Other states use language similar to
Fish’s. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-211(4)(b) (2007) (a third party who “has established a child-parent relationship with the child” may seek custody); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 109.119 (2007) (permitting a third party “who has established emotional ties creating a child-parent relationship” to seek custody); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-5-29
(2006) (permitting a third party who has “served as a primary caretaker, has closely
bonded as a parental figure, or has otherwise formed a significant and substantial
relationship” to seek custody).

R

\\server05\productn\N\NYL\12-1\NYL102.txt

2008]

unknown

Seq: 37

CHILDREN, KIN, AND COURT

8-MAY-09

10:49

79

day-to-day basis through interaction, companionship, interplay, and
mutuality that fulfill the child’s psychological needs for a parent as
well as the child’s physical needs.”160 Oregon uses a similar definition, adding that the relationship must have existed for six months.161
Kentucky is even stricter, requiring the third party to have been the
“primary caregiver” and “financial supporter” of a child for at least
one year.162 The American Law Institute has suggested an even
stricter standard for third party standing, proposing that standing
should only be granted to third parties who have lived with the child
for two years and have been the primary caretaker due to a “complete
failure or inability of any legal parent” to do so.163 In other words, the
parents would have to be “absent, or virtually absent, from the child’s
life.”164 One commentator proposed granting party status only to
adults whose primary caretaking status arose with the clear consent of
the parent or under court order.165
Of the various means of limiting standing surveyed thus far, the
parent-like relationship test is the most appealing. It avoids arbitrary
limitations by type of familial relationship. By focusing on the child’s
relationship with the third party, the relationship test aligns itself with
the state interest in preserving a child’s significant relationships.166
Nonetheless, limiting standing to those who have formed parentlike relationships with children is far too narrow. The definitions just
cited would exclude many third parties with significant relationships
with children. Take the millions of children who live with a parent
and a third party, especially the millions of such children who are
primarily cared for by that third party.167 The parent’s presence might
prevent the child from “treat[ing the third party] like a parent,” in Arizona’s language, or from fully forming a “child-parent relationship” in
Montana and Oregon’s language. The latter states give courts the added difficulty of determining what specific actions constitute the
vague terms of “interaction, companionship, interplay, and mutuality.”
160. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-211(6) (2007).
161. OR. REV. STAT. § 109.119(10)(a) (2007).
162. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.270(1)(a) (LexisNexis 2007). Kentucky’s time period for children under three years old is shorter—only six months. Id.
163. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.03(c)(i)–(ii)(B) (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2000).
164. Id. at cmt. c, pt. iii.
165. See Bartlett, supra note 42, at 946–48 (proposing three criteria—six months of
physical custody, “mutuality” or “genuine care and concern for the child,” and that the
relationship have originated from parental consent or under court order).
166. See Troxel, 530 U.S. 57, 64 (noting state interest in protecting children’s existing significant relationships).
167. See supra notes 33–45 and accompanying text.
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Put another way, these states’ terminology suggests a binary
world—either a third party is like a parent or the third party is excluded from court. This black and white approach covers the easy
cases—where a third party has been raising a child alone for years or
where a third party has no connection at all to a child—but fails to
account for the full “network of attachments” that children form168
and the significant role third parties play in millions of children’s
lives. Put another way, these states’ terminology does not adequately
analyze common murky situations. Consider a parent whose severe
mental health or drug problem makes him or her an inconsistent figure. When the parent is missing (physically or otherwise), the third
party steps in and takes responsibility for the child. When the parent
is present, the third party remains an important part of the child’s life
but defers to the parent. This situation, I believe, presents a fairly easy
case for third party standing—many third parties in this situation will
legitimately need custody to obtain services for the child when the
parent is missing or to protect the child from the real harm caused by
the parent’s problems, especially if their illness or addiction takes a
turn for the worse.169 Yet in this situation, the third party might not
qualify as a parent-like figure and thus might be excluded from court.
These complicated situations might prove to be especially difficult
cases, but that difficulty is precisely why the parties should have the
opportunity to present evidence and arguments to a judge, rather than
be summarily shown the courthouse door.
Other flaws exist in the relationship language. Focus on psychological bonds—particularly apparent in Montana and Oregon’s definitions170—will be harder to show for very young children, especially
infants. Such children are, of course, particularly vulnerable if their
parent is incapable of caring for them and are often particularly in
need of services arranged by a legal custodian. Courts therefore ought
to be particularly open to suits by third parties who have a view to
whether the parent has been caring for the child adequately.
Some states have drafted broader relationship language than what
Arizona, Montana, and Oregon have. South Dakota has adopted relationship language that permits a broader set of individuals to seek cus168. Cooper Davis, supra note 47, at 354.
169. The harms of parental drug use on children—not present in every situation involving parental drug use, but significant in many—is well documented. See LITERATURE REVIEW, supra note 49. The potential harms of severe parental mental illness
are also an acknowledged “risk factor” for child neglect. CHILD MALTREATMENT
2005, supra note 62, at 98.
170. OR. REV. STAT. § 109.119(10)(a) (2006); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-211(6)
(2006).
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tody. Primary caretakers and “parental figure[s]” may sue for custody
in South Dakota, and so can third parties who have “otherwise formed
a significant and substantial relationship.”171 The phrase “significant
and substantial relationship” may not be self-defining, but its listing
separate from third parties who have been primary caretakers and parental figures suggests that one can have a significant and substantial
relationship with a child while falling short of the high bar of a parentlike relationship. Other states establish timelines—for instance, the
District of Columbia’s statute provides that a third party who has lived
with a child for four of the last six months and has primarily assumed
parental responsibilities can seek custody.172
The American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers issued a model
third party visitation statute in 2002.173 Although the Academy addressed visitation and not custody,174 it adopted an approach similar to
the third party custody statutes in the states just discussed. The Academy would limit standing to third parties who have established a “parent-like relationship with the child” or to grandparents “with a
significant relationship with the child.”175
4. States That Grant Standing to Any Third Party When the Child
Is Not Living with a Parent
Some states permit third parties to seek custody when the child
does not live with either parent. A third party may seek custody of a
child in Illinois “only if [the child] is not in the physical custody of
one of his parents,” except in the case of stepparents or when one
171. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-5-29 (2006).
172. D.C. CODE § 16-831.02(a)(1)(B)(i) (2008). D.C. establishes a shorter timeline—the majority of an infant’s life—for babies under six months old. Colorado
requires physical care of a child for at least 6 months and permits third parties to seek
custody when a child does not live with either parent. COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10123(1)(b)–(c) (2006). Pennsylvania’s timeline—applicable to grandparents only—is
twelve months. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5313(b)(3) (2006).
173. Academy, supra note 148, at 1.
174. The Academy itself noted that it did not purport to “address claims for custody,
conservatorship, guardianship, or joint or shared custody.” Id. at 2. I address the
Academy’s recommendations regarding visitation because they coincide with some
states’ approach to custody, and the Academy’s detailed explanations provides a useful aide to exploring those states’ approach. Differences between third party visitation
and custody statutes might support broader standing for those seeking custody. The
Academy described the purpose of third party visitation cases as “principally about a
child’s right to maintain relationships that already exist.” Id. at 1. Visitation cases are
not about creating new relationships—such a purpose would interfere too much onto a
parent’s prerogatives—and they are not about ensuring safety for the child (because
visitation is insufficient to protect a child from an abusive or neglectful parent). Custody cases, in contrast, can sometimes be about promoting child safety.
175. Id. at 2.
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parent is deceased.176 A third party may seek custody of a child in
Arizona “only if the child is not in the physical custody of one of the
child’s parents.”177 Colorado’s statute is similar: a third party may
seek custody “but only if the child is not in the physical care of one of
the child’s parents.”178 New Mexico requires that the child live with
the third party (and without the parent) for at least ninety days before
the petition is filed, and the parent with legal custody of the child must
be unwilling or unable to care for the child.179
This approach has some legal appeal. When a child is already
not living with either parent, the parent’s interest may be weaker.
Their claim to “retain” custody of their child weakens when they do
not have physical custody of the child.180
Nonetheless, this approach fails to take into account millions of
children and families. As noted previously, approximately 14 million
children live with third parties in addition to their parents.181 Millions
of those children are primarily cared for by the third party.182 When
the third party has played such a significant role, it is morally questionable to exclude that third party from seeking custody of the child.
Limiting standing to cases when the parents do not live with the child
would exclude these millions of children.
Just as bad, limiting standing to situations in which the child does
not live with either parent excludes the millions of stepparents caring
for children.183 Consider, for instance, a twelve year old girl who was
primarily raised by her stepmother after her father remarried when she
was three. Her father lived in the home but was a less significant
176. § 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/601(b)(2) (LexisNexis 2008). Kentucky permits “de facto custodians” to seek custody, defining that category to include individuals who have been children’s primary caretaker for one year, or, for children under
three, for six months. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.270(1)(a) (LexisNexis 2007).
177. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-401(B)(2) (2006). Arizona also permits third parties who stand “in loco parentis” to seek custody, if parental custody would be “significantly detrimental to the child,” and if the parents are either unmarried, divorcing, or
if one parent has died. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-415(A) (listing two of the
three statutory requirements).
178. COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-123(1)(b) (2006). Colorado also permits a third
party who has “had the physical care of a child” for at least six months to seek custody. COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-123(1)(c) (2006).
179. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-10B-8(B)(3) (LexisNexis 2003).
180. See infra Part V and text accompanying notes 287–305 regarding the different
standards of proof for retaining or regaining custody.
181. Supra note 9 and accompanying text.
182. Supra notes 26–29 and accompanying text.
183. See Lawrence Schlam, Standing in Third-Party Custody Disputes in Arizona:
Best Interests to Parental Rights—And Shifting the Balance Back Again, 47 ARIZ. L.
REV. 719, 746 (2005) (discussing cases involving stepparents and the “not in the
physical custody of a parent” test).
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figure in her life. Her stepmother was her primary caretaker for 9
years but never adopted her. When the girl’s stepmother and father
divorce, the stepmother seeks custody on the grounds that she was the
girl’s primary caretaker, is more closely bonded to her and better able
to raise her than her father.184 This stepmother, who has a plausible
claim to custody, would be barred from court because the child has
always lived in her father’s home.185
5. States That Limit Third Party Custody Actions to Divorce or a
Parent’s Death
A number of states limit when a third party can sue for custody,
providing that they can do so in the context of a divorce proceeding,
or if one parent has died. These states provide that third parties (limited, or not, in the manner discussed in the previous four sections) can
be awarded custody “[i]n an action for divorce.”186
Such requirements impose a legal significance to marriage that,
for better or for worse, bears little resemblance to modern family
structures. Parents need not be married to have rights to the custody
of their children and marriage should similarly not impact third parties’ rights. Even the ALI’s suggested standing provisions—which
are, in my view, far too narrow—suggest that state laws other than
those regarding “family dissolution” may be available for third parties
seeking custody.187
184. See Olvera v. Superior Court, 815 P.2d 925 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991).
185. Indeed, the Arizona court held that a stepmother lacked standing to seek custody of a child in a divorce case, even if she was more closely bonded with the child
than the biological father. Id. at 927 (“If one of the parents has physical custody of
the child, a non-parent may not bring an action to contest that parent’s right to
continuing custody under the ‘best interest of the child’ standard.”) (citation omitted).
The court required the stepmother to prove that the father’s parenting fell “short of the
minimum standard of the community at large.” Id.
186. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-13-101(a)(1)(A)(i) (2008); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32717(1) (2006); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-160 (2005). See also ALASKA STAT.
§ 25.24.150(a) (2007) (allowing for a third party custody suit “[i]n an action for divorce or for legal separation or for placement of a child when one or both parents have
died . . . .”); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1610(a)(5)(C) (2006) (providing for third party
custody if the court determines it appropriate “during the proceedings” under the divorce statute); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.04(A) (West 2005) (allowing for a third
party custody suit “[i]n any divorce, legal separation or annulment proceeding . . . .”);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-101(a)(1) (2006) (allowing for a third party custody suit
“[i]n a suit for annulment, divorce or separate maintenance . . . .”); W. VA. CODE
§ 48-9-103(b) (2006) (providing that third parties may intervene in existing custody
cases).
187. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.21 cmt. c, illus. 5 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2000) (noting that third parties
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B. States Can Constitutionally Adopt Broad Standing
No principle of constitutional law poses a barrier to broad standing. Troxel found no constitutional problem with the standing of a
third party to petition for visitation under an entirely unlimited third
party standing statute.188 Of all the various Troxel opinions, only Justice Souter’s suggested that the unlimited standing provision “subject
only to the State’s particular best interests standard” posed constitutional problems.189 Justice Kennedy noted that litigation itself (which
could be prevented by limiting standing) might impose a burden on
parents, but did not state whether the unlimited standing provision at
issue in Troxel was constitutionally void.190
The New York Court of Appeals recently endorsed the interpretation that Troxel mandates a substantive preference for parental custody, but no limitation on standing.191 “The problem in Troxel was
. . . not that the trial court intervened,” that is, not that a third party
could sue, “but that [the trial court] failed to employ” the correct substantive standard.192 The Washington Supreme Court—which had issued the decision which led to Troxel—upheld the Washington statute
permitting anyone to file for custody of a child,193 rejecting an argument that Troxel required it to limit standing.194
The Supreme Court, in Moore v. City of East Cleveland, established that the Constitution does recognize the rights and interests of
extended family members to live together.195 Ruling that Inez Moore
could not be criminally liable for living with her son and grandchil-

without standing under family dissolution laws could consider “the state’s guardianship law or its laws governing child abuse or neglect.”).
188. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 69 (2000) (“The problem here is not that the
Washington Superior Court intervened, but that when it did so, it gave no special
weight to Granville’s determination of her daughters’ best interests.”).
189. Id. at 76–77.
190. Supra note 128 and accompanying text.
191. E.S. v. P.D., 863 N.E.2d 100, 105 (N.Y. 2007).
192. Id.
193. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.10.030 (West 2005) (permitting “a person other
than a parent” to commence a child custody proceeding).
194. Shields v. Harwood, 136 P.3d 117, 124 (Wash. 2006) (rejecting the parent’s
claim that the stepparent lacked standing to seek custody and imposing a “heightened
legal standard” instead of a standing requirement).
195. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503–04 (1977) (extending the
constitutional protection afforded to the nuclear family under the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment to extended family members by striking down a city
ordinance that excludes a grandmother and her grandson from the definition of
family).
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dren (one of whom lived without either parent196), the Court noted that
the “tradition of uncles, aunts, cousins, and especially grandparents
sharing a household along with parents and children has roots equally
venerable and equally deserving of constitutional recognition” as the
rights of nuclear families.197 Citing a string of parents’ rights
cases,198 the court recognized the interests of extended family members to live together. Moore did not put extended family members on
equal planes as parents, but it does show that the Constitution recognizes that extended family members who have lived with children
have a significant interest in remaining together.
Taken together, the lack of any votes in Troxel for a constitutional rule limiting standing, the respect shown for third party
caregivers such as extended family members in Moore, and the lack of
any other suggestion by the Supreme Court that respecting parents’
rights requires limiting the standing of others lead to the conclusion
that the Constitution does not impose any limitations on which third
parties can sue for custody.
C. Why States Should Adopt Broad Standing Provisions
Opponents of broad third party custody statutes complain that letting too many people file for custody will lead to frivolous, burdensome, and harassing litigation.199 The criticism is not that these third
parties will actually win custody of a child—such concerns refer to the
substantive standard that third parties must satisfy to win. The criticism, rather, articulates a significant interest on behalf of potential defendants in avoiding lawsuits. Custody cases are draining affairs,

196. Id. at 496–97 (explaining that Ms. Moore lived with her son, Dale Moore Sr.,
Mr. Moore’s son, Dale Jr., and with another grandson, John Moore, Jr., the son of an
absent son of Ms. Moore’s).
197. Id. at 504.
198. Id. at 499 (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399–401 (1923); Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.
158, 166 (1944); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 231–33 (1972); and Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972)).
199. The criticisms received by the District of Columbia when introducing its bill are
instructive. After a third party custody bill that provided for unlimited standing was
introduced, one legal services provider described the bill as “radical” because it would
permit anyone to sue for custody at anytime. “[T]his bill could aptly be titled the
‘Universal Custodial Standing and Intervention Act of 2007.’ ” D.C. Council Comm.
B17-0041, supra note 31 (testimony of Eric Angel, Legal Dir. of the Legal Aid Soc’y
of D.C.). See also PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.03 cmt. c (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2000) (“The requirements
are strict, to avoid unnecessary and inappropriate intrusion into the relationships between legal parents and their children.”).
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emotionally and financially, and are perhaps particularly so for pro se
litigants.
This concern, particularly as applied to poor families, was present
in debates regarding the District of Columbia’s third party custody
statute. The District’s Family Court is largely populated by those living in relative poverty. Everyone involved understood the third party
custody statute in the District to affect mostly lower income families.
Some of these families could find pro bono attorneys but most would
not have attorneys.200 The concern of the effect of frivolous litigation
on defendants was particularly acute—without a lawyer to help dispose of meritless claims early, these claims would lead to litigation
that would last years, and force parents and even children to endure
stressful court proceedings where immense matters were at stake.
More broadly than the District of Columbia debate, critics of
broad standing also caution that custody litigation can harm the child
in addition to burdening the parent. Joseph Goldstein, Anna Freud,
and Albert Solnit’s influential works on family law discuss the harm
caused to children by the intervention of someone other than a psychological parent: “[c]hildren,” they wrote, “react even to temporary infringement of parental autonomy with anxiety, diminishing trust,
loosening of emotional ties, or an increasing tendency to be out of
control.”201 The Academy relied on this general principle to justify its
limits on standing in visitation cases.202 Anyone working in this field
must recognize the strong bonds that exist between the vast majority
of parents and children; these bonds could be harmed if the child understood the parent’s role to face a severe legal threat.
Critics’ arguments for limited standing requires another step: not
only must one accept that custody litigation could pose a harm by
itself to families, but one must also accept that there is a substantial
risk of individuals with weak claims to custody subjecting families to
such litigation. Critics have raised the specter that without standing
limitations, “disgruntled nann[ies],” “ideologue[s] who disagree with
the parents’ childraising decisions,” or “relatives with no relationship
200. The largest number of individuals who sought assistance from the District of
Columbia’s Family Court Self-Help Center, which serves pro se parties, did so regarding custody cases. RUFUS G. KING, III, SUPERIOR COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA, FAMILY COURT 2007 ANNUAL REPORT 99 (2008), available at http://
www.dccourts.gov/dccourts/docs/family/family_annualreport2008.pdf.
201. JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, ANNA FREUD & ALBERT SOLNIT, BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 25 (1979).
202. See Academy, supra note 148, at 4 (quoting GOLDSTEIN, ET. AL., THE BEST
INTERESTS OF THE CHILD: THE LEAST DETRIMENTAL ALTERNATIVE, supra note 201,
at 25).
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with” children will sue for custody and disrupt family life.203 These
claims also implicitly assert that the harm caused by the predicted
meritless claims is greater than the harm caused by any meritorious
claims that would be screened out.
These calls for standing limitations are not convincing. They fail
to consider the harm posed by excluding legitimate cases from court
and they assert risk of meritless claims without empirical support to
establish that this risk has any likelihood.204 Further, these concerns
do not address the strong policy and constitutionally-cognizable interests of children and families who could be excluded from court and
from obtaining custody orders by limited standing requirements. One
cannot legislate perfect standing requirements—those that allow all
meritorious plaintiffs to sue and none others. The question is how to
skew the errors in the best—or perhaps the least harmful—manner.
To answer this question, one needs to evaluate the comparative likelihood of significant numbers of frivolous claims being filed under a
broad standing regime versus that of significant numbers of children
and families being harmed by limited standing. This analysis requires
both an empirical evaluation and a value determination—whether one
family excluded from court is equal to one family unfairly subjected to
litigation.
My argument will proceed on two tracks. First, I will argue that
the best available evidence empirically demonstrates that broad standing provisions do not hurt families the way critics predict. Additionally, a third party custody statute and a family court system can
include various provisions and structures to minimize the harm of
meritless third party custody cases. This empirical reality contrasts
with the empirical data and common fact patterns discussed in Part I,
which demonstrates the significant numbers of third parties with legitimate reasons to seek custody who would be excluded from court if
203. Letter from Jonathan Smith, Executive Director, Legal Aid Society of the District of Columbia, et al., to Tommy Wells, Chairperson, Committee on Human Services (Jan. 31, 2007) (on file with author). The specter of “disgruntled nannies” suing
for custody led the D.C. Council to include a provision banning individuals employed
by parents to provide child care duties from seeking custody. D.C. CODE 16-831.02
(2008).
204. Nancy Polikoff reached a similar conclusion when addressing the issue with a
focus on the standing and custody rights of same sex couples. She concluded that
“[j]urisdictional hurdles do not serve the best interests of children because they limit
those who may request custody or visitation on the basis of their legal status, regardless of their functional status.” Polikoff, supra note 42, at 510–11. Polikoff suggested a solution roughly in line with mine: “permit anyone to seek custody or
visitation, but to impose a heavy substantive burden on those who try to overcome a
parental preference.” Id. at 510.
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states adopted strict standing limitations. Second, I will argue that the
harms to children whose custody cases are excluded from court are
more severe than those caused by meritless litigation.
1. Existing States with Unlimited Standing Provisions Suggest that
the Concern with Clearly Meritless Litigation Is a
Small One
Several states permit anyone to file for custody of a child. Those
states include California, Washington, Maryland, Virginia, and others
noted above.205 A review of the case law reveals no evidence that
these states have seen an influx of clearly meritless third party custody
cases—that is, cases filed by individuals with no significant connection to the child or with no proof of some significant harm to the child
caused by parental custody. Professor Guggenheim notes that despite
the “breathtakingly broad” statute at issue in Troxel, Washington
courts had not seen people seek visitation who had no relationship
with the child.206 Justice Stevens made the same point in his Troxel
dissent, disputing the notion that suits by people without a significant
connection to the child would be common.207
The lack of reported cases involving attenuated petitioners without colorable claims to custody may have two explanations. First, few
such cases may be filed. Second, attenuated third parties may file
cases only to lose them (how quickly is unclear) in trial courts.208
However, a review of D.C.’s experience with effectively unlimited
standing reveals that only the first proposition is most likely true. Although D.C.’s custody laws have since been changed by the enactment
of a third party custody statute,209 prior to its enactment,210 third par205. See supra notes 136–40 and accompanying text. I base the conclusions asserted
in this paragraph on a review of case annotations to these statutes. Those annotations
do not reveal large numbers of cases involving attenuated petitioners with no colorable claim to custody.
206. GUGGENHEIM, WHAT’S WRONG WITH CHILDREN’S RIGHTS, supra note 117, at
32 (“[T]here is no evidence that the statute has ever been used in this way. Certainly,
there are no reported cases involving such attenuated petitioners.”).
207. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
208. To more fully test which of these two propositions is true would require more
empirical research than currently exists. A comprehensive study of such claims filed
in jurisdictions with various standing requirements would advance the debate regarding third party standing significantly. Such a study does not exist, however, and states
currently must use what information is available to make a policy determination.
209. D.C. CODE § 16-831.01 to .13 (LexisNexis Supp. 2008).
210. Common law governed custody disputes involving third parties prior to enactment of this statute. That common law was far from clear. The right of any third
party to seek custody was litigated over many years, with the D.C. Court of Appeals
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ties routinely were permitted to seek custody in court.211 The courts
simply did not see cases of attenuated third parties seeking custody.
Rather, the courts saw people in the categories listed in Part I.B. seeking custody.212 Critics have raised troubling hypothetical cases of various harms posed by broad standing, but these concerns are purely
hypothetical and are not based in fact. One critic testified to the
Council that abusive boyfriends of mothers would harass them by filing for custody of their children, but when questioned by a Council
member, that critic could not think of a single case in which that fact
pattern occurred.213 Contrary to these critics, the factual record shows
that third parties with attenuated connections to children simply are
not inclined to seek the awesome responsibility of raising those
children.
This conclusion addresses just one of the concerns with broad
standing—that individuals would sue without legitimate cases, no significant connection to the child or no indication that parental custody
would harm the child. It does not address concerns that third parties
with some legitimate claims but not enough to deserve custody will
seek custody and impose on parents and children the burden of litigation and the risk of an erroneous judgment. I will next address how to
balance those concerns against the harm to children who could face
harm if third parties who should win custody are excluded from filing
suit.

once noting that third parties’ right to do so “is not at all obvious.” A.J. v. L.O., 697
A.2d 1189, 1191 n.5 (D.C. 1997).
211. See D.C. Council Comm. B17-0041, supra note 31 (letter from Eric H. Holder,
Jr. to Tommy Wells, Chair of the D.C. Council Comm. Subcomm. on Human Servs.,
(Jan. 31, 2007)) (“During my tenure as a judge, the right of non-parents to file for
custody was not in question and these cases were litigated as a routine practice.”);
Diane M. Brenneman & Linda J. Randin, Domestic Relations Manual for the District
of Columbia, § 8.04[5], 8-30 to 8-31 (2005) (discussing substantive standards in custody disputes between parents and third parties).
212. See D.C. Council Comm. B17-0041, supra note 31 (testimony of Judith
Sandalow, Executive Dir. of The Children’s Law Ctr.). In addition, Avi Sickel
worked for six years as an attorney at the Pro Se Project in the Montgomery County,
Maryland, Circuit Court. Maryland has unlimited third party custody standing and
Sickel reported to the author that attenuated third parties with clearly meritless claims
did not burden families with litigation. Such third parties simply did not file for custody. Most third parties seeking custody were, instead, existing long-term caretakers
or individuals who had shared significant child rearing duties with parents and had
increasing concerns about the parent’s ability to raise the child.
213. See D.C. Council Comm. B17-0041, supra note 31 (testimony of Su Sie Ju).
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2. Overly Restricting Standing Will Cause Greater Harm to
Children
To justify limits on standing beyond what I have proposed, one
must argue that either those meritless cases can be effectively
screened out without excluding meritorious cases, or that it is acceptable to screen out meritorious cases because the harm to children and
families of screening out such cases is less than the harm of permitting
frivolous cases. Neither argument is supportable.
First, a significant number of meritorious cases would be excluded from court through any of the commonly used standing limitations. All means of limiting standing will inappropriately exclude
some valid cases, as will be discussed further in Part III.A.
Second, excluding families from the courthouse can severely
harm children and families, while the threat of harm from frivolous
litigation, as discussed above, is minor due to the scarcity of such
frivolous suits. Children can lose the custodians who are best for them
and be forced instead to live with parents whose custody is demonstrably harmful to the child. Loss of the proper custodian—perhaps for
their entire childhood—imposes a greater harm on children than the
temporary doubts raised by litigation. Children in need of particular
services or benefits may go without if their third party caretaker cannot obtain a custody order necessary to navigate the red tape to obtain
those services and benefits.214 Other, more complicated forms of
harm to children can occur. Children could be diverted to the neglect
system, which, as discussed above, could be significantly more harmful to the children and costly to the state than a custody case.
It must also be noted that the general description of harm to children by litigation questioning their parents’ authority is greatly lessened when third party standing is limited to individuals who have
some significant connection to the child in question. The general concerns raised by the Academy and Goldstein above215—that children
may be harmed when litigation questions the authority of their parents
or their relationship with their parents—are less intense when the parent has already ceded some or most of that authority in practice by
permitting a third party to build significant relationships with a child.
However, those concerns may even point in the opposite direction.
214. The obstacles faced by low income individuals obtaining services and benefits
are well documented. See, e.g., DANIEL K. SHIPLER, THE WORKING POOR: INVISIBLE
IN AMERICA 230 (2005) (“Blessed are the poor who have lawyers on their side” to
navigate unfriendly bureaucracies).
215. GOLDSTEIN, ET.AL., BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD, supra note 201
and accompanying text.
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When a parent in biology but not in practice seeks to infringe the
authority of a third party who has been a parent in practice, the child
may be more harmed by the third party’s inability to stand up for his
or her relationship with the child. The “parental autonomy” that Goldstein, Freud and Solnit trumpeted216 is only worth trumpeting when
the parent-child relationship has built up that autonomy.
D. Reducing the Potential Harm of Broad Standing
I do not advocate turning a blind eye to the costs of broad standing noted above: the burdens of litigation and, worse, erroneous decisions. Meritless litigation does, as critics suggest, impose a cost on
parents and children who are forced to endure and respond to it.
Those costs are especially great for poor families, who do not have a
right to an attorney,217 and face the stress of court proceedings without
assistance.
As a result of these costs, state policymakers should create
checks designed to protect families and courts against these harms,
without closing the courthouse doors to children and families who
need them open. Such checks can impose a self-selection process on
third parties; before filing a case and triggering court processes,
policymakers can establish a process for which third parties are forced
to consider the merits of their claim. Ideally, any third party custody
law should be structured to ensure that only those suits with allegations serious enough to warrant depriving a parent of custody can go
forward. Third parties with other claims should be discouraged from
filing and, when such third parties do file, their suits should be dismissed quickly so as to provide legal stability to the parent and child
and protect them from unnecessary litigation. This goal, however,
cannot adequately be achieved with the blunt tool of limiting standing.
Fortunately, some alternative means of reducing harm from frivolous
litigation exist.
The law should require third parties to satisfy strict pleading requirements. Third parties should describe in detail what facts justify
their plea for custody, and, indeed, several states have imposed such

216. Id. at 24.
217. The Supreme Court has ruled that no absolute constitutional right to counsel
exists in termination of parental rights cases, let alone custody cases. Lassiter v.
Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 31–32 (1981). Third party custody statutes do not
generally provide for appointed counsel. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 16-831.06(c) (2008)
(permitting a court to appoint counsel for parents, third parties and children, but
neither requiring the court to do so nor providing funding to do so).
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pleading requirements on third parties seeking custody.218 Such
pleading requirements should be grounds for third parties without
strong claims to pause before filing for custody. And they will enable
courts to promptly dismiss those complaints that do not state a claim
sufficient to satisfy the substantive standard (which I will discuss in
the next section). Second, courts should similarly use pretrial hearings
to determine if third parties will have sufficient evidence to prove their
allegations. Without such evidence, courts should grant summary
judgment to the parents.
Court systems should focus on implementing and enforcing
pleading and pretrial hearing procedures, especially in cases involving
pro se litigants who may not actively pursue pretrial motions to dismiss or for summary judgment. There is no substitute for a highly
qualified judiciary, knowledgeable in the law, attuned to the reality of
pro se litigation, and able to weed out frivolous cases. Courts can
establish processes to treat pro se litigants fairly and respectfully.219
Court systems can also provide services to pro se litigants which can
serve multiple purposes. Offices like a Family Court self-help
center220 can help third parties decide whether to seek custody and can
help parents determine whether they can seek dismissal of a claim
promptly.
Courts should also be forced to make decisions quickly; if a case
must be litigated, it at the very least ought not drag on for years. Legislatures can set specific timelines. The District of Columbia’s 2007
third party custody statute provides a limited model: whenever a court
grants pre-trial relief—that is, whenever a court grants temporary custody pending litigation to a third party—the parties are entitled to a
trial date within 120 days from the temporary custody order.221 Such
deadlines can limit, at least temporally, the stress and disruption
caused by custody litigation.
Recognizing the potential harm of custody litigation, states
should reduce incentives for third parties to seek custody orders. First,
states can create out-of-court means for third parties and parents to
218. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 16-831.02(a)(1)(C) (2008) (requiring third parties basing
standing on “exceptional circumstances” to plead those facts with specificity); WASH.
REV. CODE § 26.10.030(1) (2006) (requiring third parties to allege that a child’s parents are not “suitable” custodians).
219. See, e.g., Jonathan M. Smith & Eric Angel, Reform of the Superior Court is
Necessary to Achieve Judicial Neutrality, WASH. LAWYER 30, 30–34 (Oct. 2007)
(proposing court reforms to improve handling of pro se cases).
220. See, e.g., Family Court Self-Help Center, http://www.dccourts.gov/dccourts/superior/family/selfhelp.jsp (last visited Aug. 26, 2008).
221. D.C. CODE § 16-831.09(b)(1) (Supp. 2008).
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reach legally enforceable agreements about the care of children.
States can provide, for instance, for a custodial power of attorney.222
Second, states through legislation and regulations can ensure that a
custody order is not necessary to obtain services and benefits for children.223 This task—both legislative and administrative—can reduce
the number of situations in which families must make a detour to court
to obtain services and benefits for children.
IV.
THE SUBSTANTIVE STANDARD: PARENTAL PRESUMPTION
REBUTTABLE BY HARM TO THE CHILD
While millions of children have a third party as primary caregiver
and millions more have a third party significantly caring for them, the
norm remains that one or two parents have the full legal and physical
custody of their children.224 Parents have fundamental constitutional
rights to the care and custody of their children225 and the children, in
turn, have a constitutionally cognizable interest in their relationship
with their parents.226 I have discussed the wide variety of situations in
which third party custody is necessary to protect children’s relationships with third parties and to protect the children from harm, justifying wider standing provisions than many states currently allow. Once
admitted to court, however, courts must provide close scrutiny to third
parties’ cases to ensure that the desired custody order is really necessary to prevent the alleged harm to the child.
A. A Harm Standard Is More Appropriate than a Best Interests
of the Child Standard
There can be no doubt that the Constitution requires states to apply a parental preference. The Court states in Troxel that states must
accord “some special weight” to the parent’s desires for his or her
child and recognizes the presumption that a parent will act in his or

222. See D.C. CODE § 21-2301 (Supp. 2008).
223. See, e.g., Safe and Stable Homes for Children and Youth Amendment Act of
2007, D.C. Act 17-70 § 3 (amending D.C. CODE § 4-251.03 (2007) by removing legal
custody requirement for the Grandparent Caregivers Pilot Program).
224. While 2.9 million children do not live with either parent, more than 60 million
live with at least one parent. CHILDREN’S LIVING ARRANGEMENTS AND CHARACTERISTICS: 2002, supra note 18, at 2 tbl.1.
225. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000).
226. See Wallis v. Spencer, 202 F.3d 1126, 1136 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Parents and children have a well-elaborated constitutional right to live together without governmental
interference.”).
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her child’s best interests.227 To rebut this presumption, states should
require third parties seeking custody to prove that parental custody
would impose some affirmative harm on the child, either by severing
some particularly strong attachment with the third party or by some
harm that will befall the child in the parent’s custody. A best interest
of the child standard—which asks judges to determine which individual would “best” serve a child’s “interests”—does not provide sufficient “special weight” to the parent-child relationship.228
The best interest of the child standard is notoriously vague, a
quality which leads to unpredictable and subjective judicial decision
making, leading judges to consider factors such as “who offer[s] a
better neighborhood, better schooling, more financial capability, or
more stability.”229 It instructs judges to make subjective decisions
about “the interaction and interrelationship of the child” with potential
adult caregivers and the “sincerity” of the adults.230 Wide segments of
the legal community view the best interests of the child standard as
providing, in the words of the New Jersey Supreme Court, a “judicial
opportunity to engage in social engineering in custody cases.”231 The
vagueness of the best interest of the child standard too often “invites
the judge to rely on his or her own values and biases to decide the
case,” rather than a more principled basis.232 A vague, subjective
standard may lead to inconsistent rulings from court to court, and permit individual judges to make custody decisions (in favor of either a
parent or a third party) without strict guideposts. It is true that courts
could interpret a best interests of the child standard narrowly to satisfy
constitutional concerns,233 but using the standard itself signals to
judges that they have the authority to decide a child’s fate based on
their own subjective evaluation of what is “best” for that child.

227. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 70.
228. See infra note 231.
229. McDermott v. Dougherty, 869 A.2d 751, 808 (Md. 2005).
230. D.C. CODE §§ 16-914(a)(3)(C), 16-914(a)(3)(N) (2001).
231. See Watkins v. Nelson, 748 A.2d 558, 567 (N.J. 2000) (relying on other state
courts’ decisions criticizing the best interest standard as dependent more on judicial
opinion of parents than on the rule of law (citing Turner v. Pannick, 540 P.2d 1051,
1054 (Alaska 1975) and In re B.G., 523 P.2d 244 (Cal. 1974)). See also Polikoff,
supra note 42, at 511–16 (describing troublesome best interest analyses in several
cases).
232. GUGGENHEIM, WHAT’S WRONG WITH CHILDREN’S RIGHTS, supra note 117, at
40.
233. See, e.g., Troxel, 530 U.S. at 84 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting the common use of the best interests standard in Washington statutes and court decisions “as
if the phrase had quite specific and apparent meaning.”).
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One iconic family law case read frequently in law school courses
illustrates the danger of applying a best interests of the child standard.
In Painter v. Bannister, the Iowa Supreme Court applied a best interests of the child standard in its decision regarding a custody dispute
between a child’s father and grandparents.234 The Court’s reasoning
illustrates the subjective considerations that a best interests analysis
permits, as the Court awarded custody to the grandparents due to the
Court’s concerns about the father’s “Bohemian” lifestyle.235 None of
the reasons cited by the Iowa Supreme Court address the three core
benefits of a third party custody order discussed in Part I.B.
The vagueness and subjectivity of the best interests of the child
standard raise constitutional problems when it is applied in a contest
between parties on unequal constitutional footing. Following Troxel,
judges must give “special weight” to the parent-child relationship.236
A best interest of the child standard leaves too much room for individual judges’ value judgments to render that “special weight” meaningless. The Maryland Court of Appeals explained this point well: “The
best interest of the child standard is axiomatically, of a different nature
than a parent’s fundamental constitutional right.”237 States should reserve the best interest of the child standard, if at all, for legal contexts
between individuals standing on an equal plane, such as one parent
suing another for custody.238 In contrast to the best interest of the
child standard, the harm or detriment standard finds its roots in Supreme Court cases describing the contours of rights within a family.
For more than sixty years, the Court has stated that parents’ rights to
do as they please regarding their children reach their limits when a
serious risk of “psychological or physical injury” arises.239 As a result, until harm to a child’s physical or mental health is posed, the
234. Painter v. Bannister, 140 N.W.2d 152 (Iowa 1966).
235. The Iowa court did not analyze the relationship between Harold Painter and his
son Mark or Mr. Painter’s ability to meet his son’s needs. Instead, it contrasted the
“stable, dependable, conventional, middle-class, middlewestern background” of
Mark’s grandparents (the Bannisters) with the “romantic, impractical and unstable”
life that would result from his father’s “Bohemian approach to finances and life in
general.” In short, during the middle of the 1960s, the court approved more of Mark’s
straight-laced grandparents than his “political liberal” father. See id. at 154–55.
236. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 70.
237. McDermott v. Dougherty, 869 A.2d 751, 808 (Md. 2005).
238. See id. (“In cases between fit natural parents who both have the fundamental
constitutional rights to parent, the best interests of the child will be the ultimate, determinative factor.”) (emphasis in original, quotation omitted).
239. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979) (noting the state’s power to limit
parental discretion “when [children’s] physical or mental health is jeopardized”). See
also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233–34 (1972) (“To be sure, the power of the
parent . . . may be subject to limitation under Prince if it appears that parental deci-
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Constitution would likely prevent a judicial decree limiting a parent’s
right to custody. Troxel left that conclusion in some doubt, however,
by declining to rule whether a third party must establish harm to the
child to defeat a parent’s opposition to visitation.240 However, as the
impact on a parent’s rights is greater when custody is at stake than
when visitation is at stake, the argument that a harm standard is constitutionally justified is stronger.
The constitutional roots of the harm standard signals to judges
that they must make the presumption required by Troxel meaningful;
they must require third parties to provide some significant proof of
why a child’s parents cannot be trusted to raise the child. Sending this
signal to judges will add meaning to the checks on frivolous litigation
discussed in the previous section and will help limit third party custody lawsuits to situations involving third parties significantly bonded
to children or seeking to protect children from a significant harm.241
If third parties must plead in detail the grounds of their lawsuit and
judges, at an early stage in the litigation, measure those details against
a harm standard (as opposed to a best interests standard), then third
parties who clearly will not prevail can be more easily prevented from
burdening parents and children with litigation. One reason that broad
standing is acceptable is that the presence of a high substantive standard (especially when coupled with pleading requirements enforced
by a high-quality judiciary) can reduce the harm posed by unmeritorious litigation.
Put another way, a harm standard tethers custody litigation to the
three central needs of children and caregivers discussed in Part I.B. If
the child needs a service and the parent is unavailable to consent to it,
then (at least for some services, such as certain types of medical care),
the child will face harm if the third party lacks authority to consent to
that service.242 If the parent is severely abusing or neglecting the
child, parental custody would be harmful.243 Finally, if the child has
strongly bonded with the third party, to a significantly greater degree
than the child has bonded with the parent, and the parent would sever
the third party bonds, then parental custody would be harmful. Evidence short of these situations—especially the sort of subjective evidence that the best interest of the child standard—would not suffice.
sions will jeopardize the health or safety of the child, or have a potential for significant burdens.”); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944).
240. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 73.
241. See supra text accompanying notes 218–23.
242. See supra notes 11–18 and accompanying text.
243. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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Holding third parties to a harm standard helps to ensure that
courts fairly adjudicate cases involving low income families, especially minority families that embrace extended kinship networks to
help raise children. As explained in Part I.A. the large and increasing
numbers of third party caregivers are especially prevalent within certain racial and ethnic groups as well as among low income families.244
Given the large number of situations in which third parties are significant caregivers—including situations in which parents are largely absent, abusive, or neglectful—I have argued that it is important for
third parties to have access to court if they believe a legal custody
order is necessary.245 But there is another side to this coin—the prevalence of third party caregiving also reflects the choice of many parents to engage an extended kinship network to help raise their children
due to financial, cultural, and other factors.246 This choice does not
harm children in the least, so policymakers must craft substantive
standards to ensure that merely taking on a significant role in a child’s
life does not entitle a third party to custody. Critics have charged that
psychological theories relating to bonding and attachment as interpreted by the flexible and discretionary best interests of the child standard turns such theories and laws into “a weapon against low-income
families of color.”247 A harm standard allows both the parties and the
courts to shift the focus toward more appropriate questions.
Take a situation in which a third party has shared some significant childrearing duties with a parent; I have argued that such third
parties should have standing to seek custody. But applying a harm
standard makes clear that taking on significant child rearing duties is
not, by itself, grounds for obtaining custody. Some other fact must be
present. For example, as a result of being raised exclusively by the
third party, the child’s attachment to the third party may be so much
greater than to the parent as to make parental custody harmful. Or the
third party may have taken on child rearing duties because the parent
is somehow incapable of taking care of the child adequately. Or perhaps the child needs a particular and important service and the parent
is unavailable to provide consent. A harm standard demands that third
244. See supra note 25.
245. See supra Part I.
246. See Cooper Davis, supra note 47, at 350 (describing the “network of kin attachments” that many children form). See also supra note 25 (describing socioeconomic
variations in third party caregiving, which suggest financial and cultural factors which
lead to significant third party involvement).
247. See e.g., GUGGENHEIM, WHAT’S WRONG WITH CHILDREN’S RIGHTS, supra note
117, at 250 (describing harm to such families in neglect cases, which typically involve
one form or another of a “best interest of the child” standard).
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parties establish evidence of this sort. A best interests of the child
standard, however, would lead some judges to evaluate qualitatively
the third party’s caretaking versus the parent’s caretaking, without
giving sufficient deference to the parent. Such subjective evaluations
would be prone to far too many unjustified and arbitrary decisions. In
situations in which a parent shares significant child rearing duties with
a third party because the parent values extended kinship networks or
“as a hedge against poverty,”248 a harm standard would protect families against unwarranted judicial decrees.
B. A Harm Standard Is More Appropriate than
an Unfitness Standard
An alternative substantive standard which states might consider
would require a third party to prove that a parent is not fit to raise the
child in question. An unfitness standard focuses on the parent’s abilities: whether the parent has the minimum ability necessary to raise the
child in a fit manner, rather than the effects of a custody decision on
the child.
In most situations, there will be no functional difference between
a harm standard and an unfitness standard. If a third party lives with a
child and has tried but failed to find the child’s parent for an extended
time such that the third party cannot obtain important services for the
child, then the parent’s absence may amount to abandonment. Even if
the parent’s conduct falls short of abandonment, it may have been
neglectful to the point of unfitness to have left the child in another
person’s care without providing some means to obtain important services. If a third party lives with a child and the child’s parent and sues
for custody to protect the child from the parent’s abuse, that abuse
renders the parent unfit.
However, in certain narrow circumstances, a harm to the child
standard will differ from an unfitness standard. Such situations include third parties serving as long term primary caretakers, who are
involved in custody disputes with parents, who at the time of the dispute, are fit.249 Other situations may include those described in Part
248. Eliza Patten, The Subordination of Subsidized Guardianship in Child Welfare
Proceedings, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 237, 250 (2004).
249. See Bennett v. Jeffreys, 356 N.E.2d 277, 280 (N.Y. 1971) (applying a substantive standard other than the unfitness standard, using the terms “prolonged separation”
between parent and child; such a separation might establish “extraordinary circumstances” that would justify granting a third party custody over a fit parent’s objection).
See also Martin Guggenheim, Rediscovering Third-Party Visitation Under the Common Law in New York: Some Uncommon Answers, 33 N.Y.U. REV. OF L. & SOC.
CHANGE (forthcoming 2008) (discussing Bennett).
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I.B.3–4 in which the third party has not been the child’s primary caretaker for long and in which the parent may not have been away from
the child long enough to have legally abandoned the child.250 Yet the
child may need a particular service in that time, and will be harmed if
the third party cannot provide it.
In these situations, a harm to the child standard focuses the parties and the decision maker on the most important relationships involving the child. In reality, parents are not the only adults to have
significant or even primary relationships with children; millions of
children have such relationships with third parties.251 A harm to the
child standard recognizes the interests of children and third parties in
such relationships and security in their living arrangements. Thus, a
harm standard signals to courts that they must consider the child’s
existing relationship with the third party and whether that relationship
is so great that custody with anyone else would harm the child. Additionally, there are significant numbers of children who have been
away from their parent’s care and in the care of a third party for a
relatively short period of time.252 Such children have important needs
that should not go unmet for arbitrary time periods.253
One example demonstrates both the difference between a harm
standard and an unfitness standard and why that difference is important. Consider a parent who recognizes that her drug addiction and
severe mental illness prevents her from adequately caring for her newborn daughter. Wanting the best life possible for the child, she arranges for her sister, the child’s aunt, to take care of her while she
seeks to conquer her addiction and treat her illness. Relapses mark
this effort, and the aunt cares for the child for years. During that time,
the child’s mother is a sporadic presence in her child’s life. When the
child is eleven, the mother reappears, sober, with her mental illness
treated and managed. The mother is now unarguably fit to raise children, and she demands custody of her daughter and will not permit a
250. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 16-2316 (2008) (imposing a four month timeline on
parental abandonment).
251. See supra Part I.A.
252. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
253. This is not to say that any service a third party custodian wants to provide
should be grounds for granting custody. A court should engage in some analysis into
the importance of providing that service at that particular time rather than waiting for
the parent’s return or for the third party to have been a primary caretaker for a longer
period of time. They should still inquire whether the lack of the particular service at
the particular time will amount to a sufficient harm to the child to warrant a legal
change in custody. And, absent a present service need, children away from their
parents for a short period of time—too short to develop bonds equivalent to parentchild bonds—likely face no harm from the absence of a third party custody order.
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continuing connection to the aunt. A fitness standard, as at least one
court has interpreted it, would compel acquiescence to the mother’s
demand.254 The harm or detriment standard would not automatically
lead to that result. It would instead evaluate not only the parent’s
current status and functioning, but the entire history of the child’s relationships with significant caretakers, including the effect transferring
custody to the mother would have on the child and whether that would
significantly harm the child by severing his bonds with his aunt.255
Because the harm standard recognizes the preeminence of the parentchild relationship, the parent may still prevail in this case, especially if
the aunt can maintain her role in the child’s life and the child can be
transitioned to the mother’s care without harming the child. But those
are large conditions. The harm standard gives the aunt the opportunity
to prove that they will not be satisfied and to obtain legal recognition
of the parental role she has taken on over the child’s lifetime.
A harm standard treats fairly a parent who has willingly allowed
a third party to develop a strong parent-like bond with the parent’s
child. Professor Martin Guggenheim, a leading critic of policies and
legal doctrines developed in the name of “children’s rights,” has written convincingly on the subject of parents who ask a third party to take
on a parental role:
There is hardly anything unfair in saying to a parent who voluntarily invited someone else to share parenting and to develop a significant parent-child relationship with his or her children that the
parent must allow the logical consequences of that choice to play
themselves out. It is wrong both for parents and children to encourage the disruption of significant bonds for the sole reason that
the biological parent prefers such a disruption.256

254. See Clark v. Wade, 544 S.E.2d 99, 103 (Ga. 2001) (describing how under a
since-revoked fitness standard, the courts had to focus on “the parents present fitness”). One could parse the term “fit” to declare the mother unfit to raise this particular child, given the years of absence. But the facts of real cases are often more
complicated. The mother could very easily have been involved in the child’s life just
enough so that a state’s definition of abandonment is not met. For instance, the District of Columbia defines abandonment as having “made no reasonable effort to maintain a parental relationship with the child for a period of at least four (4) months.”
D.C. CODE § 16-2316(d)(1)(C) (2008).
255. I note that the answers to these questions depend on the facts of each case, as
does the ultimate result—full parental custody, full third party custody, or some form
of joint custody. Even with such a long absence, parental custody might not harm the
child. That conclusion is more likely if the parent has been significantly involved in
the child’s life, and the aunt and the child can develop a transition plan and continued
contact with the aunt.
256. GUGGENHEIM, supra note 117, at 126.
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The harm standard thus balances a child’s relationship with his
parent alongside his relationship with a longstanding third party primary caregiver better than the unfitness standard. This balancing is
supported by Troxel and other Supreme Court cases that came before
it.257
Troxel empowers states to balance a parent’s fundamental right
with the value of a child’s relationship with a third party.258 A state
seeking to remove a child from a parent and place the child with strangers in foster care stands in a fundamentally different situation regarding the family than a third party who has raised a child for years
seeking to continue that role and obtain formal legal custody. The
same balancing should be applied when a third party is rearing a child
in the parent’s absence and that individual needs to obtain important
services for the child. As explained above, Troxel frees policymakers
to engage in this sort of analysis.259 Six justices recognized a strong
interest of children in maintaining significant relationships with third
parties.260 Troxel pointedly does not require that a third party prove
that a parent is unfit, explicitly holding that a fit parent may lose a
visitation case to a third party.261 Troxel refused to even demand that
a harm standard be applied in all cases between third parties and parents, leaving states to sort out such questions.262
A harm standard balances the right of the parent and child to
maintain their relationship with each other with the child’s relationship with a significant third party. Such balance is especially important in a private suit between one person closely connected to a child
and a parent of that child. This basic nature of a custody case—a
battle between private individuals each claiming a significant connection to the child—separates private custody cases from those situa257. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 69, 73 (2000) (requiring state courts to
apply “some special weight” to a parent’s preference but declining to rule whether the
harm standard was required and giving no hint that an unfitness standard was
appropriate).
258. Supra note 103 and accompanying text.
259. See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse & Sacha Coupet, Troxel v. Granville: Implications of at Risk Children and the Amicus Curiae Role of University-Based Interdisciplinary Centers for Children, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 857, 870 (2001) (“For now,
experimentation with the proper balance between the interests of the state, those of
parents, and those of other family members, is left to the laboratory of state legislatures and state courts, with Supreme Court oversight as an outer limit, to be provided
as the case law evolves.”).
260. See Troxel, 530 U.S. 57.
261. See id. at 68 (noting that the Troxels made no claim that Granville was unfit,
and this fact “is important, for there is a presumption that fit parents act in the best
interests of their children”).
262. Id. at 73.
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tions in which the fitness standard arose. To intervene in a family, a
state must prove parental unfitness.263 But state intervention through
a neglect case represents a different sort of intervention. State intervention in a family finds its basis in the state’s parens patriae role visà-vis all children. But the state never has a strong, significant, existing
caretaking role with children that third parties who seek custody have.
The six Troxel justices recognized that in disputes between parents
and third parties, policymakers may choose to balance the relationships between parents and children with the relationships children
have with those third parties. The parent-child relationship is preeminent, of course, but the third party-child relationship has value as well.
Even prior to Troxel, significant support for a harm standard existed both in Supreme Court case law and the prevailing understanding
of child development. The Court’s precedents provide constitutional
recognition to third parties who serve as children’s primary caretakers,
suggesting the appropriateness of the harm standard’s balancing of
such third parties’ interests with parents’ interests. The Supreme
Court’s seminal family rights cases apply equally to parents and third
parties who raise children. Pierce v. Society of Sisters provides that
constitutional rights, at least against the state, lie in both “parents and
guardians.”264 The rights described in Pierce apply not just to parents. Rather, all “those who nurture [the child] and direct his destiny
have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare
him for additional obligations.”265 Prince v. Massachusetts even involved a third party caretaker—Sarah Prince “was the aunt and custodian of Betty M. Simmons, a girl nine years of age.”266 Ms. Prince
challenged the provision of a child labor law to her supervision of
three children—her niece Betty and two of her own children—in their
efforts to proselytize. The Court’s analysis—beginning with Prince’s
right “to bring up the child” as Prince saw fit267—did not differ between the three girls. Citing Prince, Justice Brennan wrote for the
Court in Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and
Reform that “[t]he scope of these rights extends beyond natural par263. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972).
264. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925). Meyer v. Nebraska,
commonly cited as the first parents’ rights case, does not mention parents in its famous list of rights protected by constitutional due process. Those rights include the
right “of the individual to . . . establish a home and bring up children.” Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). See also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233
(1972) (describing “the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and
education of children under their control”) (emphasis added).
265. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535.
266. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 159 (1944).
267. Id. at 164.
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ents. The ‘parent’ in Prince itself, for example, was the child’s aunt
. . . .”268
Smith does establish that some due process rights exist in longterm third party caretakers.269 This conclusion flowed from Justice
Brennan’s explanation that “the importance of the familial relationship, to the individuals involved and to the society, stems from the
emotional attachments that derive from the intimacy of daily association . . . as well as from the fact of blood relationship.”270 Smith gave
one example where a third party would have some constitutionallyrecognized rights:
At least where a child has been placed in foster care as an infant,
has never known his natural parents, and has remained continuously for several years in the care of the same foster parents, it is
natural that the foster family should hold the same place in the
emotional life of the foster child, and fulfill the same socializing
functions, as a natural family.271

Surely that same conclusion applies to a child raised from birth
for several years by a third party. Indeed, such a third party has a
greater claim to constitutionally-recognized interests than foster parents. Unlike foster parents, third parties caring for children through
private arrangement do not seek custody to preserve “a foster family
which has its source in state law.”272 Rather, these third parties seek
to vindicate “a relationship having its origins entirely apart from the
power of the State,” which, Smith strongly suggested, was of a higher
constitutional order, reflecting “intrinsic human rights.”273
Echoing Smith, some lower courts have recognized constitutional
interests that attach to long-term third party-child relationships. The
Second Circuit Court of Appeals has recognized that extended family
members who have raised children in their physical custody for several years have a “substantial” constitutionally recognized interest.274
Other courts have followed suit, writing, for instance, that “grandpar268. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 816, 843 n.49 (1977) (citing Prince,
321 U.S. at 159).
269. Smith did not decide the question whether foster parents have constitutionallyprotected liberty interests in the custody of foster children. Id. at 847 (explaining that
it is possible to resolve the case on narrower grounds). But, as the text explains, it
makes clear that some third parties do have constitutionally-protected liberty interests.
270. Id. at 844.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 845 (suggesting there is a lesser liberty interest where the relationship
between child and foster parent is created by the state). See also id. at 857 (Stewart,
J., concurring).
273. Id. at 845.
274. Rivera v. Marcus, 696 F.2d 1016, 1024–25, 1027 (2d Cir. 1982).
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ents who have a long-standing custodial relationship with their
grandchildren such that they constitute an existing family unit do possess a liberty interest in familial integrity and association.”275
Pierce, Prince, and Smith all involved cases balancing a state’s
parens patriae interest against an individual’s due process rights. A
third party custody case differs: it balances the third party’s interests
(which, as I have just argued, sometimes rise to constitutional dimension) against the due process rights of parents.276 But when a parent
has not been a child’s primary caretaker for some long period of time,
the weight on the parents’ side of that scale is significantly lessened.
In the years subsequent to Smith, the Court explained that the strength
of parental rights depends on the relationship between the parent and
child.277 In the Court’s oft-quoted passage, “[p]arental rights do not
spring full-blown from the biological connection between parent and
child. They require relationships more enduring.”278 Even Stanley
framed the parental right at issue as a father’s “interest in retaining
custody of his children,” not in regaining custody surrendered voluntarily or obtaining custody for the first time.279 Lehr held that a parent
who failed to seize his opportunity interest in his child could lose all
parental rights to that child.280
I submit that the power of a court to determine that a parent has
forfeited his or her constitutional status entirely can include the lesser
power to determine that a third party’s primary role and a parent’s
concomitant secondary role affects the balance of power between the
third party and parent. For third parties who establish their long-term
primary caretaker bona fides, the law should balance their role with
the parent’s role by only requiring the third party to prove that paren275. Osborne v. City of Riverside, 385 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1054–55 (C.D. Cal. 2005)
(quotations omitted) (citing Mullins v. Oregon, 57 F.3d 789, 794, 796 (9th Cir.
1995)). The Seventh Circuit has also suggested that third parties who have acted “as
custodians” for a significant period of time have some due process rights. Ellis v.
Hamilton, 669 F.2d 510, 513–14 (7th Cir. 1982).
276. See Rivera, 696 F.2d at 1024 (noting the “unavoidable tension between protecting the liberty interests of the natural parents while also extending familial rights” for
foster parents).
277. The Court did so in a trio of cases exploring the constitutional rights of unwed
fathers, beginning with Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255–56 (1978), and
continuing with Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 394 (1979), and Lehr v. Robinson, 463 U.S. 248, 267–68 (1983). The Court’s focus on unwed fathers appears
quaint, but its reasoning remains applicable in various family law contexts.
278. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 260 (quoting Caban, 441 U.S. at 397) (quotations omitted).
279. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 652 (1972).
280. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 262–63 (noting that the child of a father who had failed to
seize his opportunity interest in his parental rights could be adopted without receiving
notice or an opportunity to be heard).
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tal custody would harm the child, rather than proving that a parent is
unfit to care for the child. Applying this conclusion would not erase
the rights of such parents, as a Lehr finding would; the parent would
still benefit from the presumption that custody is in the child’s best
interests, but the third party could win custody by proving the strength
of his or her attachment with the child and the harm that severing that
bond would cause to the child. This argument is rooted in some of the
same principles that underlay legal protections for the parent-child relationship: stable relationships with caretakers are crucially important.
Simply interfering with those relationships harms children, and we
must guard against unwarranted intrusions on such relationships.281
The harm standard may also lead to different results than an unfitness standard when a third party who has not been a long-term primary caretaker seeks custody. When a third party seeks custody to
obtain a service for a child before the third party has been raising the
child for a long time—that is, before the parent has been absent long
enough to be deemed unfit—then the third party’s claim should rest
on the importance of the service at issue. Without having raised the
child for a significant time, the third party will not have evidence regarding the child’s attachment to him or her. But that does not render
irrelevant the third party’s primary caretaking role at the time the third
party seeks custody. Solely by having custody of the child, even for a
short time, the third party’s status has increased. The parent would
then seek to regain custody, rather than retain it, a distinction the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence suggests has significance.282 And that
difference, I argue, permits state policymakers to focus on the needs of
the child, not only on whether the parent’s conduct sinks to the level
of unfitness.
C. State Laws
Twenty-two of the fifty states that permit third party custody follow the approach that I advocate. Only about a dozen states require a
showing of parental unfitness, and some of those states do not even
use the term “unfit.”283 On the other end of the spectrum, seventeen
281. See GOLDSTEIN, ET.AL., THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD: THE LEAST DETRIALTERNATIVE, supra note 21, at 19–40 (explaining that “placement decisions
should safeguard the child’s need for continuity” with the child’s primary caretaker).
282. See supra notes 278–79 and accompanying text.
283. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 721(e)(1) (2006) (requiring a finding that the child
“is dependent or neglected”); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 1653(2)(C) (2007)
(requiring a third party to establish “jeopardy” to the child, which is defined as “serious abuse or neglect” by ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 § 4002(6) (2008)); MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 209C §10(d) (2007) (providing that third parties can prevail if the parents
MENTAL

R
R
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states provide that a third party may obtain custody via a best interests
showing, although after Troxel even these states would have to start
with a presumption that parental custody serves a child’s best interests.284 The balance of states has adopted an approach akin to what I
endorse.285 The Maryland Court of Appeals (Maryland’s highest
consent or if the parents “are unfit to have custody”); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-524(1)(e) (2007) (permitting a grant of custody to a third party if the parents have
abandoned the child or “are mentally, morally or otherwise unfit to rear and train the
child”); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-10B-8(B)(3) (2007) (parent is “unwilling or unable to
provide adequate care”); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 21.5(A) (2007) (requiring a
showing of parental death, consent or that the parent is “unfit or unable to exercise
parental rights and responsibility”); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 2645(2) (2007) (requiring third party to show that the parent is “incompetent or unsuitable to have the custody of the person of the minor”); Street v. Street, 731 So. 2d 1224, 1225 (Ala. Civ.
App. 1999) (“[T]he court must find . . . that the parent is so unfit for custody”); In re
Marriage of Reschly, 334 N.W.2d 720, 721 (Iowa 1983) (requiring third parties to
show that a parent is unsuitable); In re Marriage of Nelson, 125 P.3d 1081, 1086
(Kan. Ct. App. 2006) (noting that absent waiver or agreement by at least one parent, a
parent “who has not been found to be an unfit person” cannot lose custody); Henderson v. Henderson, 568 P.2d 177, 181 (Mont. 1977) (holding that third parties must
demonstrate abuse or neglect to prevail); Clifford K. v. Paul S., 217 S.E.2d 138, 160
(W. Va. 2005) (noting unfitness requirement).
284. See generally ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-13-101(a)(1)(B) (2006) (explaining that
when a court order holds that an award of custody to a grandparent is in the best
interests of the child, a grandparent’s sex ought not to be considered); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 571-46(2) (2006); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-717(1) (2006) (codifying that the
best interests of the children should be considered before and after judgment in divorce proceedings); § 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/602 (2006); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-172-8 (LexisNexis 2006); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.270(b)(2) (LexisNexis 1999)
(providing for best interests standard once a third party has established “de facto custodian” status); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 131 (2006); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 722.23 (West 2006); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-364(1) (2006). See also NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 125.480(1) (2006) (determining custody when child resides with party
found to be perpetrator of domestic violence is domain of court and should be based
solely on the best interests of the child); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50-13.2(a) (West
2006); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.04(D)(1)(d)(2) (West 2006); 23 PA. STAT. ANN.
§ 5313(b) (West 2006) (codifying that a grandparent has standing to petition for custody of a child); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-101(a)(1) (2006) (codifying that a court
should award custody “as the welfare and interest of the child or children may demand”); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.2(B) (2006); Ogden v. Rath, 755 A.2d 795, 799
(R.I. 2000) (remanding case for custody determination based upon best interests considerations); Tuckey v. Tuckey, 649 P.2d 88, 90 (Utah 1982) (holding that a court
should apply a best interests standard when making child custody determinations, with
a presumption in favor the natural parents).
285. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-415(A)(2) (2006) (“significantly detrimental to the
child”); CAL. FAM. CODE § 3041(a) (West 2004) (“detrimental to the child”); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-56b (2006) (“detrimental to the child”); D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 16-831.07(a)(2) (LexisNexis 2001) (“detrimental to the physical or emotional wellbeing of the child”); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257C.03(7)(1)(ii) (West 2005) (“physical or
emotional danger”); MO. REV. STAT. § 452.375(5)(5)(a) (2006) (“unfit, unsuitable, or
unable to be a custodian, or the welfare of the child requires,” distinguishing “welfare
of the child” from “best interests”); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 72(2)(a) (McKinney
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court), surveying the states, concluded that the “majority approach”
was to first recognize a presumption of parental custody, rebuttable by
a showing of harm, detriment, or unfitness, and to then evaluate
whether third party custody was in the child’s best interests.286 The
American Law Institute has similarly proposed a harm standard for a
third party to obtain custody of a child over a parent’s objection.287
The large number of states with a best interests of the child standard poses a concern. That standard is not constitutionally rooted,
does not signal courts to apply close scrutiny to third parties’ claims,
and permits too much variation from one courtroom to another. These
states should consider changing their substantive standard to harm or
detriment to the child.

2008) (“extraordinary circumstances,” such as “[a]n extended disruption of custody”);
OR. REV. STAT. § 109.119(4)(a) (2006) (“detrimental to the child” is one of several
factors); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-5-29(4) (2006) (“extraordinary circumstances exist which . . . would result in serious detriment to the child”); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 153.433(2) (Vernon Supp. 2008) (parental custody “would significantly impair the
child’s physical health or emotional well-being”); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 767.41(3)(a)
(West 2007) (parents cannot “care for the child adequately,” a phrase distinguished
from “fit”); Evans v. McTaggart, 88 P.3d 1078, 1082–83 (Alaska 2004) (summarizing
cases establishing that a third party must prove parental unfitness or “that parental
custody would clearly be detrimental to the child”); In re E.L.M.C., 100 P.3d 546,
549 (Colo. App. 2004) (upholding third party custody order because parental custody
would have risked “emotional harm,” without deciding whether harm was a required
showing); Richardson v. Richardson, 766 So. 2d 1036, 1038, 1043 (Fla. 2000) (permitting third parties to obtain custody only by initiating “dependency proceedings”
and noting that any third party custody statute must require “proof of a substantial
threat of significant and demonstrable harm to the child”); Clark v. Wade, 544 S.E.2d
99, 107 (Ga. 2001) (requiring third parties to prove “that parental custody would harm
the child” prior to a best interest analysis); McDermott v. Dougherty, 869 A.2d 751,
808–13 (Md. 2005) (requiring the third party to prove “extraordinary circumstances”
which include factors such as time away from parent’s home); In re R.A. & J.M., 891
A.2d 564, 578 (N.H. 2005) (holding that unfitness is not required but that “some
exceptional circumstances” are); Watkins v. Nelson, 748 A.2d 558, 563–64 (N.J.
2000) (“unfitness, abandonment, gross misconduct, or ‘exceptional circumstances,’ ”
which include “the probability of serious psychological harm”); Moriarty v. Bradt,
827 A.2d 203, 205 (N.J. 2003) (holding that third party must demonstrate “harm to the
child” to be granted visitation); Patzer v. Glaser, 368 N.W.2d 561, 563 (N.D. 1985)
(holding that “exceptional circumstances” required to grant third party custody);
Camburn v. Smith, 586 S.E.2d 565 (S.C. 2003) (requiring third party to prove parental
unfitness or compelling circumstances); Toms v. Toms, 98 S.W.3d 140, 145 (Tenn.
2003) (“substantial harm”); In re Custody of Shields, 136 P.3d 117, 118 (Wash. 2006)
(“actual detriment”).
286. McDermott v. Dougherty, 869 A.2d 751, 783 (Md. 2005).
287. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.21(1)(a)(ii) (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2000).
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V.
BURDEN

OF

PROOF

The final question state policy makers must answer is what burden of proof a third party must satisfy. I advocate a bifurcated approach: generally, the law should require third parties to present clear
and convincing evidence. Such an elevated burden reflects the constitutional rights of parents to the care and custody of their children, and
the concomitant rights (or at least interests) of children to their relationship with their parents. Given the norm of parents raising children, the law should skew any error in custody cases in favor of
parent-child relationships. But in cases where the third party has
raised the child for some significant amount of time, parental rights
are lessened. When facts establish that the parent-child norm has not
existed, the law ought not skew error in favor of individuals who have
not been primary caretakers.
The Supreme Court has established the purpose of a burden of
proof:
The function of a standard of proof, as that concept is embodied in
the Due Process Clause and in the realm of factfinding, is to “instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctess of factual conclusions
for a particular type of adjudication.”288 Addington teaches that, in
any given proceeding, the minimum standard of proof tolerated by
the due process requirement reflects not only the weight of the private and public interests affected, but also a societal judgment
about how the risk of error should be distributed between the
litigants.289

In light of this purpose and the fundamental nature of the parentchild relationship, a clear and convincing evidence standard is most
appropriate. The law and social norms expect parents to raise children, and especially when a third party seeks to remove a child from a
parent’s physical custody, the courts should skew the risk of error in
favor of the constitutionally-recognized relationship. But when the
third party has been the child’s primary caregiver for a lengthy period
of time, when the parent’s relationship with the child does not involve
“some embodiment of [a] family,” then the parent’s rights have been
diminished.290 The child’s interest in maintaining their current
288. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 754–55 (1982) (citing Addington v. Texas,
441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979)) (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970)) (Harlan,
J., concurring).
289. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 756.
290. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 88 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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caregiver relationship shifts the balance; between the parent and the
third party, there is no need to skew error in either direction.
As with the substantive standard, the burden of proof signals to
the court how to treat third party custody cases. The elevated clear
and convincing standard instructs courts to hold third parties to a high
burden, and if it appears they cannot meet that burden, to grant summary judgment to the parent or otherwise quickly dispose of the case.
At the same time, providing a preponderance of the evidence standard
for longstanding primary caregivers signals to courts that in such
cases, the child and third party’s relationship is one that approaches
the parent-child relationship in legal standing. The court, therefore,
needs to consider carefully the bonds that have formed between the
third party and child and the effect on the child of severing those
bonds.
California comes close to the bifurcated standard that I advocate.
Third parties in California generally must prove that parental custody
would be detrimental to the child by clear and convincing evidence.291
But, if the third party is “a person who has assumed on a day-to-day
basis, the role of his or her parent, fulfilling both the child’s physical
needs and the child’s psychological needs for care and affection and
who has assumed that role for a substantial period of time,”292 then the
elevated burden of proof does not apply. Indeed, merely proving that
the third party is such a person shifts the burden to the parent to prove
that parental custody would not be detrimental.293 By actually placing
the burden of proof on parents, California has gone one step further
than I advocate. And by establishing a vaguely worded standard without objective measures (such as “at least twelve months” instead of a
“substantial period of time”), judges may interpret California’s statute
more broadly or narrowly than I would support. But California’s recently-enacted statute294 does recognize the essential difference between long-term primary caregiver third parties and others, and other
states should follow suit.
291. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3041(b) (West 2004).
292. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3041(c) (West 2004).
293. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3041(d) (West 2004). Hawaii, like California, shifts the
burden of proof to parents when the third party “has had de facto custody of the child
in a stable and wholesome home and is a fit and proper person.” HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 571-46(2) (2006). Such third parties are entitled prima facie to custody, effectively
shifting the burden to parents. Id. In Kentucky, once a third party proves by clear and
convincing evidence that they are “a de facto custodian,” then no burden of proof is
stated, meaning a preponderance burden likely applies. KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 403.270 (LexisNexis Supp. 2007).
294. The relevant portions of California’s statute were enacted in 2002, two years
after Troxel. Assem. B. No. 1938, 2002 (Cal. 2002).
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Beyond California, most other states apply a preponderance of
the evidence standard,295 or do not specify a standard, in which case
the preponderance of evidence standard applies.296 A minority require
clear and convincing evidence in all cases.297
Some state courts have justified a preponderance of the evidence
standard in every third party custody case, and have done so through
troubling, superficial analysis. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals, for instance, has held that “for statutes terminating only some of
a parent’s rights to his or her child, the preponderance of the evidence
standard does not violate the Constitution’s due process requirements.”298 In the view of that court, although a parent would lose the
care, custody and control of a child, residual rights—such as the right
to visit the child, to choose the child’s religion, or to consent or not to
the child’s marriage—made the custody issue sufficiently minor as to
not warrant an elevated burden of proof. The Maryland Court of Appeals has similarly held that, unlike parental rights termination and

295. See, e.g., In re A.D.C., 969 P.2d 708, 710 (Colo. App. 1998) (applying preponderance standard to third party custody case); Fish v. Fish, 939 A.2d 1040, 1066
(Conn. 2008) (holding “that the proper standard of proof is a fair preponderance of the
evidence” in a third party custody case); Shurupoff v. Vockroth, 814 A.2d 543 (Md.
2003) (holding that the trial court, in applying a preponderance of the evidence standard to a third party custody case, applied the correct standard and that a clear and
convincing evidence standard is neither required nor appropriate); Moriarty v. Bradt,
827 A.2d 203, 205 (N.J. 2003) (applying preponderance standard to third party visitation cases). See also OR. REV. STAT. § 109.119(3)(a) (2006); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 153.433(2) (Vernon 2006).
296. The following states’ statutes do not specify the burden of proof to apply: Arkansas, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts,
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New York, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, Washington,
West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
297. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-415(B) (2006); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-831.06(b)
(2005); MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 722.25(1) (2008); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 257C.03(Subd. 7)(1) (2007); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-10B-8(C) (2003) (carving an
exception only for the federal Indian Child Welfare Act where the burden of proof is
proof beyond a reasonable doubt); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.2(B) (2006); Street v.
Street, 731 So. 2d 1224, 1225 (Ala. Civ. App. 1999); Evans v. McTaggart, 88 P.3d
1078, 1079 (Alaska 2004); Clark v. Wade, 544 S.E.2d 99, 100 (Ga. 2001); Stockwell
v. Stockwell, 775 P.2d 611, 613 (Idaho 1989) (explaining that Idaho case law has held
that non-parents need to show “clear, satisfactory, or convincing evidence” (citation
omitted)); In re R.A. & J.M., 891 A.2d 564, 580 (N.H. 2005); Adams v. Tessener, 550
S.E.2d 499, 503 (N.C. 2001); Toms v. Toms, 98 S.W.3d 140, 145 n.5 (Tenn. 2003).
298. In re A.G., 900 A.2d 677, 680 (D.C. 2006). A.G. involved D.C.’s guardianship
statute—a third party custody statute regarding children in the neglect system—but its
language would, on its face, apply to any “statute[ ] terminating only some of a parent’s rights.” Id. The D.C. Council opted to require third parties in custody cases to
prove their case by clear and convincing evidence. D.C. CODE § 16-831.06(b) (2008).
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adoption, in which clear and convincing evidence is required,299 a custody case would leave parents with certain residual rights. A custody
order could be modified at a later date and, more importantly, parents
would retain the right to visit and communicate with the child.300
Other parental rights may also remain after a third party custody order,
such as reciprocal inheritance rights and the right to determine the
child’s religion.301
These courts’ analyses do not withstand scrutiny. A parent’s
residual rights after losing a third party custody case are just that—
residual. A parent’s right to visitation and similar rights are important
to both the parent and the child, but they are peripheral to the core of a
parent’s rights. When parents lose custody, they lose the care, custody
and control of their child—the fundamental elements of the parentchild relationship recognized by repeated Supreme Court cases.302
The modifiability of custody orders does not obviate the need for an
elevated burden. Santosky itself noted that many “reversible official
actions” require an elevated burden.303 Seeking modification is a
daunting task—the parent would have the burden of proving, for example, “that there has been a substantial and material change in circumstances” and that modifying custody “is in the best interests of the
child.”304 Particularly after time has passed—time in which a third
party has raised the child and formed stronger bonds with the child
which a change in custody could damage—the slim prospect of modification provides little solace to a parent who has lost custody.
Accordingly, in disputes between most third parties and parents—especially parents protecting their existing custody of a child—
the law should hold third parties to a heightened burden of proof.
When the parents could lose the core of their parental rights, such a
burden is generally constitutionally mandated.

299. See Shurupoff v. Vockroth, 814 A.2d 543, 549 (Md. 2003).
300. See id. at 552.
301. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 16-831.10 (Supp. 2008) (listing parental rights that remain after a third party custody order); Shurupoff, 814 A.2d at 552 (noting reciprocal
inheritance rights).
302. E.g., Troxel, 530 U.S. at 66.
303. See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 759. The Santosky court noted that if some reversible
actions received an elevated burden of proof, then surely an irreversible termination of
parental rights decision should receive an elevated burden. Id. For present purposes,
my point is merely that the reversibility or modifiability of a custody order does not
alone justify a preponderance burden of proof.
304. D.C. CODE § 16-831.11(a) (2008).
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A. Preponderance of the Evidence for Long-Term Caretakers
The general rule just described should differ when the third party
has been the child’s primary caretaker, and when the parent seeks to
regain (or obtain for the first time) rather than retain physical custody.
In such cases, the law should only hold third parties to a preponderance of the evidence burden of proof, for reasons similar to those that
justify a harm to the child rather than unfitness of the parent standard.305 Just as the harm standard balances the role of long-term primary caretaker third parties with the role of parents, so does a
preponderance of the evidence burden of proof. Once a third party has
established that he or she has been the child’s primary caretaker by
clear and convincing evidence, then the law should only require that
individual to meet his or her burden of establishing that parental custody would harm the child by a preponderance of the evidence.
B. Connection to Standing and Substantive Standard
The burden of proof structure for which I have argued—preponderance of the evidence for long-term primary caregivers and clear
and convincing evidence for everyone else—should not affect any debates regarding who ought to be able to file for custody of a child.
There is relatively little controversy that longstanding primary
caregivers—the only set of third parties who I argue should receive
the preponderance of the evidence burden of proof—ought to be able
to seek legal custody of a child. Debates regarding standing relate to
who, other than longstanding primary caretakers, ought to be able to
seek custody—and under the approach I advocate, those individuals
would need to meet their substantive burden with clear and convincing
evidence.
CONCLUSION
Third party caregivers are essential elements of life for millions
of families. Millions of children live with third parties, often without
clear legal relationships governing the relationships between third
party caregivers and children. The result can be particularly chaotic
disputes between third parties and parents over custody; unnecessary
family disruption through the child welfare system; and, even when
the third party’s custody is undisputed, difficulties obtaining services
and benefits to raise children—a disproportionate number of whom
live in poverty or have a disability and thus particularly need access to
305. See supra Part IV.B.
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services and benefits. State custody law regarding third parties, however, varies greatly, especially regarding which third parties are permitted to seek custody of a child. States should revise their laws to
follow three core recommendations. First, states should permit a
broad set of third parties to seek custody. States should check the
small risk of meritless litigation through pleading requirements, assistance to pro se litigants, and removal of custody requirements. Second, states should require third parties to prove that parental custody is
or would be harmful or detrimental to the child’s physical, mental or
emotional well-being. Third, in most cases, states should hold third
parties to a clear and convincing evidence burden of proof. A preponderance of the evidence burden is appropriate only when third parties
are a child’s long-term primary caregivers.
Some states are close to these standards; California and the District of Columbia provide two good examples. But many are not.
Many states limit who can seek custody too narrowly, leaving some
children and their families left out of legal protection even when necessary to protect them from harm. On the other end of the spectrum,
many states do not hold third parties to a sufficiently high burden,
permitting them to prove their case by a flexible best interests of the
child standard or by a minimal preponderance of the evidence burden
of proof.
State policy makers should reconsider their third party custody
laws in line with my suggestions above. The result, I believe, will be
the provision of important legal options for the millions of children
who are cared for by third parties, and more rigorous and consistent
adjudication of difficult custody cases.

